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Internet voting in Australian election 
systems 
1. Introduction 
1.1 This paper has been commissioned by the Electoral Council of Australia and New 
Zealand (ECANZ) and prepared by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 
Aims 
1.2 The issue of internet voting is one of the more testing ones currently faced by 
election administrators, not least because of the diversity of views which it generates.  
Proponents of such a use of the internet see it as a potentially powerful, and perhaps 
inevitable, way of enabling electors, or certain categories of electors, to vote in a 
convenient and efficient way.1  In the long term, it holds out the revolutionary prospect that 
the classical vision of direct democracy could be realised, with voters being able to make 
fast collective decisions on a wide range of issues.2  Opponents of internet voting see it as 
giving rise to major risks to the integrity of electoral processes.  There is a large and 
rapidly growing literature on the subject.3 
1.3 The aims of this paper are: 
■ to explore a range of significant issues relevant to community consideration of the 
appropriate role for internet voting in Australia; and 
■ to identify some areas where internet voting may have potential value (subject to 
the satisfactory resolution of outstanding technical issues and a determination that 
any residual risks can be mitigated or deemed acceptable), and therefore to 
warrant more detailed consideration. 
1.4 The focus of this paper is solely on the potential use of the internet for elections for 
public office, and for referendums or other ballots conducted as part of the political 
process.  Elections and ballots for private organisations, or for non-political purposes 
(such as polls conducted under the Fair Work Act 2009 and the Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act 2009) fall outside the scope of this exercise. 
                                               
1 For an elaboration of this view which focusses on Australia, see Hill and Alport (2007). 
2 This concept was put forward satirically in the 1960s British film The Rise and Rise of Michael 
Rimmer, and has been more recently elaborated by Morris (2001). 
3 For relatively comprehensive analyses of different aspects of internet voting, see Alkassar and 
Volkamer (2007), Alvarez and Hall (2004), Alvarez and Hall (2008), Barrat i Esteve, Goldsmith and 
Turner (2012), Hill and Alport (2011), Holmes (2012), International IDEA (2011) and Jones and 
Simons (2012). 
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1.5 It is important to emphasise that the long history of free and fair elections in 
Australia and New Zealand provides the context for this analysis.  Broadly speaking, all 
jurisdictions in those countries have succeeded in delivering the franchise effectively over 
a sustained period of time, through credible and transparent elections which have enjoyed 
high levels of community trust.  Internet voting has not been put on the agenda as a result 
of any particular crisis or discordance with the way elections are currently conducted.  
Time horizon 
1.6 The internet has proven to be one of the most dynamic phenomena of our times.  
From a network originally developed for a relatively small group of institutional users, it 
has grown into a key component of people’s lives all over the world.  The growth has been 
accompanied by changes in typical forms of access to the internet: from desktop 
computers in offices and homes, to internet cafes, and now to tablet devices and 
smartphones.  In parallel, new applications such as Facebook and YouTube (neither of 
which were in existence ten years ago) have created opportunities for new forms of 
internet use which have become social and cultural phenomena. 
1.7 This highlights the considerable difficulty of anticipating the role which the internet 
will play in day-to-day life only a few years hence.  Realistically, this paper cannot aspire 
to a prescience which will enable permanently valid conclusions about the place of 
internet voting to be reached.  For that reason, the analysis does not seek to look forward 
further than the next five years.  Note is, however, taken of longer term trends which look 
at this point to be irreversible, such as the increased use of the internet for publication and 
communication, and the resulting decline in print publication, and in mail services 
dedicated to the distribution of hardcopy documents.  
Technical issues relating to the security of the internet 
1.8 Some of the most vexed questions relating to internet voting, and in particular 
remote internet voting, flow from concerns about internet security.4  These issues have 
                                               
4 In a widely discussed and controversial case, concerns on the part of computer scientists about 
internet security led the then US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, to cancel in 2004 
the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) which had been intended to 
test mechanisms for providing voting facilities to US voters covered by the Uniformed and 
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), many of whom were military personnel and 
their dependents.  For a discussion of this, see Alvarez and Hall (2008, pp. 77-90).  For a recent 
study which sets out a wide range of potential technical risks associated with internet voting, see 
Jones and Simons (2012; ch. 11).  Ongoing projects which involve research on internet voting 
include the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project (http://vote.caltech.edu/) and those pursued by 
the US Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
(http://www.nist.gov/itl/vote/) pursuant to its mandate under the Help America Vote Act of 2002. 
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been examined in some major research undertakings, and the literature is a large and 
evolving one.5   
1.9 There would be little to be gained from seeking here to replicate detailed studies of 
the problems of internet security of the type which have been or are being undertaken in 
many parts of the world, for the following reasons.  
■ Any “snapshot” of the situation at a particular time has the potential to be 
overtaken by events: either the emergence of new threats, or the development of 
new “fixes”, responses or mitigation strategies.  There is little prospect of being 
able to arrive at conclusions about the status of the internet’s insecurities which 
would be valid up to the five year time horizon of this paper. 
■ Many of the problems which have been identified with the security of the internet 
have the character of vulnerabilities or potential risks, rather than matters which 
give rise to a certainty of failure in a particular case.   
                                               
5 A recent study conducted under the auspices of the US Department of Commerce’s National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (Hastings, Peralta, Popoveniuc and Regenscheid (2011)) 
offers the following conclusions: 
“This paper identified desirable security properties of remote electronic voting systems, threats of 
voting over the internet from personally-owned devices, and current and emerging technologies that 
may be able to mitigate some of those threats.  Based on the capabilities of current computer 
security and voting technologies, the following three issues remain to be significant challenges faced 
by remote electronic voting systems.  
First, remote electronic absentee voting from personally-owned devices face a variety of potential 
attacks on voters and voters’ personal computers.  Since the voter’s personal computer is outside the 
control of election officials, it is extremely difficult to protect against software attacks that could violate 
ballot secrecy or integrity or steal a voter’s authentication credentials.  These are serious threats that 
are already commonplace on the internet today.  
Second, remote electronic voter authentication is a difficult problem.  Current technology does offer 
solutions for highly-secure voter authentication methods, but these may be difficult or expensive to 
deploy.  Personally-owned computers may not be able to interface with these methods, such as 
having the necessary smart card readers for cryptographic authentication using Common Access 
Cards or Personal Identity Verification cards.  
Third, it is not clear that remote electronic absentee voting systems can offer a comparable level of 
auditability to polling place systems.  Because of the difficulty of validating and verifying software on 
remote electronic voting system servers and personal computers, ensuring remote electronic voting 
systems are auditable largely remains a challenging problem, with no current or proposed 
technologies offering a viable solution.  
Many of the current and emerging technologies identified in this report are areas with active research 
and development.  Pilot projects should be encouraged, including those involving the use of voting-
specific cryptographic protocols, such as the Helios voting system …. Emerging trends and 
developments in these areas should continue to be studied and monitored.”. 
For a discussion from a proponent of internet voting who disputes these conclusions, see Kelleher 
(2013). 
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■ Therefore, in practice, decision-making on whether, and if so how, to use internet 
voting in an acceptably secure way will need to be based on a robust risk 
assessment and management process which takes into account: 
– the nature of vulnerabilities;  
– the probability that they will be exploited;  
– the impacts which any such exploitation could have;  
– strategies which could be put in place to mitigate any such impacts; and 
– the willingness of relevant stakeholders (e.g. governments, political parties, 
parliamentary representatives, election management bodies (EMBs) and 
members of the voting public) to live with a particular identified level of 
residual risk.6 
Furthermore, a system which is independently certified and audited is more likely 
to mitigate against any new and emerging vulnerabilities, discovery and 
exploitation which have the potential to otherwise emerge.  
■ Assessments of this type cannot be made in an abstract context, but must, when 
undertaken, reflect a calculation based on the best available information at the 
time.  They will inevitably reflect a mixture of hard data, information about which 
there may be considerable uncertainty, and value judgements.   
■ It is important also to emphasise that any risk assessment for the introduction of 
internet voting needs to be done comparatively: the key question is not whether 
there are risks associated with internet voting - there clearly always will be - but 
how the risks and benefits of internet voting compare with the risks and benefits of 
alternatives. 
1.10 None of the foregoing discussion is intended to downplay the significance of the 
issues which have been identified in the literature.  They have been raised both in 
Australia and elsewhere by scholars in the field of computer science who are likely to 
continue to be engaged with the issue, and need to be properly considered as part of any 
process which might lead to the introduction of a particular model of internet voting.  That 
having been said, it is also clear that there are jurisdictions both in Australia and abroad 
which have implemented internet voting systems to the satisfaction of their communities.  
Costing and planning 
1.11 It follows from the points made above that it would be beyond the scope of this 
paper to seek to set out even tentative plans or costings for any implementations of 
internet voting.  At a number of points below, however, factors which might give rise to 
significant potential costs or planning or implementation challenges are noted. 
                                               
6 For an example of such an analysis of possible voting modalities under the US Uniformed and 
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, see Regenscheid and Hastings (2008). 
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Outline  
1.12 This paper is divided into the following parts. 
1. Introduction 
2. Definition and distinctive features of internet voting 
3. Historical background 
4. The electoral environment in Australasia  
5. Rights and obligations 
6. Potential motivations for the introduction of internet voting 
7. Issues regarding internet voting 
8. Concluding observations 
Key observations 
1.13 The following key observations made in the paper are put forward not as 
prescriptive recommendations, but as pointers to issues which jurisdictions contemplating 
the use of internet voting might wish to consider in more detail. 
1. In Australia and around the world, internet voting has only been taken up on a 
comparatively limited scale for public elections.  This stands in stark contrast to the 
way in which internet-based activities have come to dominate many other fields of 
endeavour, and highlights the extent to which internet voting is yet to be 
embraced. 
2. As noted at paragraph 1.5 above, there is no emerging crisis in Australasian voting 
practice, such as massive failure of paper supplies, to which the only possible 
response is the introduction of internet voting.  That having been said, it would 
seem inevitable that paper balloting will, sooner or later, have to be replaced by 
some form of electronic voting, which may or may not involve the internet. Whether 
or not that development will constitute a crisis in itself will very much depend on 
how diligently EMBs have prepared for that contingency.  For that reason, 
prudence clearly dictates that Australian EMBs should be starting now to increase, 
or to continue to increase, their focus on the challenges and prospects of 
electronic and internet voting; to enhance their in-house expertise in the area; to 
further explore opportunities for cooperation in system research and development, 
and to undertake appropriate pilot projects where the opportunities to do so arise. 
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 3. A shift to universal internet voting would be a revolutionary development in the 
Australian context, producing what might be seen as a fundamental change in the 
character of electoral processes.  Such a change is not being advocated by any 
Australasian EMB, nor does it appear to be being pushed at the political level. 
4. Whether the use of internet voting on a smaller scale to meet the needs of 
particular groups of voters would inevitably lead to its use on a larger scale is a 
matter worth considering. 
5. Any decision-making on whether, and if so how, to use internet voting in an 
acceptably secure way will need to be based on a robust risk assessment and 
management process. 
6. A number of the issues raised in this paper relate to the place of elections in 
Australia’s system of democratic government, or to their fundamental character.  
While EMBs may have views on these, and be in a position to provide useful 
commentary or advice, they are properly matters for consideration at the societal 
or parliamentary level. 
7. Assessments of the viability of internet voting need to be approached holistically, 
taking into account not just implications for polling and counting but also for 
campaigning.  The legitimate expectations that stakeholders such as candidates, 
parties and scrutineers have regarding the way in which they will be able to 
perform their functions in an internet voting environment also need to be given full 
consideration. 
8. Any process for the implementation of internet voting needs to be supported by a 
strong and informed public and political consensus in favour of such a move.  The 
development of such a consensus is likely to be an objective realisable only in the 
long term, but an incremental approach, starting with pilot or small scale 
implementations, and proceeding at a rate with which key stakeholders are 
comfortable, would seem likely to provide a reasonable way forward. 
9. Societies and EMBs need to assess critically and realistically the cost and 
resourcing implications, including opportunity costs, of the introduction of internet 
voting. 
10. From the perspective of voter enfranchisement, the most compelling case for the 
use of internet voting in the short term (assuming that technical concerns about the 
process can be adequately addressed) would appear to arise in relation to voters 
for whom it would be a “game changer”: those who cannot otherwise vote at all, or 
cannot otherwise vote secretly and personally.  An initial focus on such voters 
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would be less problematical in terms of issues of vote secrecy and the voting 
environment than a more widespread use, and would be readily justifiable on the 
basis of the important principle of universality of access, especially for people with 
disabilities. 
11. An initial focus on a relatively small cohort of voters could also serve as a useful 
risk mitigation strategy, in the sense that if problems arise, the smaller the number 
of voters affected, the lesser will be the probability that the result of an election will 
have been influenced. 
12.  It remains for the EMBs to engage and educate stakeholders on the impact and 
potential of internet voting in participating in elections. 
2. Definition and distinctive features of internet voting  
2.1 This Part defines “internet voting”, outlines the main models for its implementation, 
and examines significant ways in which internet voting differs from traditional forms of 
paper-based voting as used in Australasia. 
Definition and main models of “internet voting” 
2.2 The Macquarie Dictionary (4th ed.) defines the internet as “the communication 
system created by the interconnecting networks of computers around the world.”  From a 
more technical perspective, the internet may be defined by reference to the TCP/IP 
communication protocol which underpins the connections between those networks, and 
between the computers which form part of them.7  The use of this common protocol 
facilitates the operation not only of the familiar World Wide Web but also internet email, 
file transfers using the File Transfer Protocol, and internet instant messaging.  
2.3 It follows that the internet, so defined, gives rise to a number of different possible 
modalities for “internet voting”.  Perhaps the simplest is “email voting”: it is possible for 
blank ballot papers to be sent to voters, who complete them, scan them in some way, and 
return them to the EMB either as an attachment to an email message, or as a document 
directly uploaded to a webpage provided by the EMB.8   
2.4 More sophisticated approaches make use of the World Wide Web to obviate the 
need for a paper ballot.  Voters under these approaches connect to a webpage, identify 
themselves and follow a process intended to establish their credentials as voters, are then 
                                               
7 It should be noted at this point that the term “computer”, in this context, increasingly encompasses 
not only traditional desktop or laptop machines, but also “smartphones” and “tablet” devices.  This 
issue is discussed further at paragraphs 4.15 to 4.22 below. 
8 The despatch of blank ballot papers to voters could be done in a range of different ways, 
including sending in hardcopy (as with postal votes), faxing, emailing as an attachment, or 
providing a facility for downloading through a website.  
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presented with the candidates, parties or options between whom or which they must 
choose, and record their choices directly.  Such “web-based” voting can in practice be 
implemented in a number of different ways. 
■ “Kiosk voting”: Access to the relevant web page may be made available only at 
“internet kiosk” sites under the control of the EMB.  Under such an approach, the 
EMB would maintain a relatively high degree of control not only of the hardware 
used by the voters, but also of the environment in which the vote was cast. 
■ “Mobile internet voting”: Such access could also be made available away from 
such sites, but using systems managed and delivered by the EMB.  For example, 
electoral visitors or mobile polling teams could visit voters in their homes or 
localities, taking with them portable devices with internet connections which the 
voters could use to vote. 
■ “Remote internet voting”: Under the most expansive model possible, voters 
would be able to access the web page for voting using any computer or device 
capable of being connected to the World Wide Web.  The EMB would have only 
limited control of the hardware used by the voter, and little or no control over the 
environment in which the vote was cast. 
The previous use in Australia of a number of these modalities is discussed further at 
paragraphs 3.6 to 3.23 below. 
2.5 It is important to highlight at this stage a number of methods of voting which use 
technology more advanced than paper and pencil, but which do not fall within the 
definition of internet voting, and therefore are not considered here.  These include: 
■ voting by fax; 
■ voting through a call centre; 
■ remote telephone voting; 
■ SMS voting; and 
■ voting using computers or custom-built electronic voting machines which are 
configured as stand-alone devices or are connected together on an isolated local 
area network and are not linked to the broader internet using the TCP/IP protocol. 
The last three of these constitute forms of “electronic voting”, of which internet voting is 
another sub-category. 
Distinctive features of internet voting 
Electronic transmission of ballots 
2.6 Every model of internet voting includes the electronic transmission of ballots.  
While hard copies may under some approaches be produced as a means of hard copy 
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verification, the transmission of the content of the voter’s ballot is invariably in digital form.  
Examples of hard copy processes are: 
■ production and completion of a ballot paper by the voter as part of an email voting 
process; 
■ production of printed output from a machine used in kiosk voting or mobile internet 
voting; and 
■ possible production as an output during an intermediate stage in the counting of 
remote internet votes. 
This represents a fundamental change from paper balloting, with implications for the 
evidence which might be put before the Court of Disputed Returns in the context of an 
election petition. 
Transparency of the process 
2.7 Electronic transmission impacts directly on the nature of the transparency of the 
electoral process.  With paper balloting, the voter typically has a sense that his or her 
ballot is in official custody from the time at which he or she casts it either by depositing it 
in a ballot box or committing it to a postal service.  This perception is also often important 
to candidates and parties.  As there is no physical ballot paper being transmitted in 
internet voting, different mechanisms are needed to confirm the integrity of votes, and 
different techniques, based on different skills, have to be used by scrutineers. 
2.8 Remote internet voting and email voting by definition take place in an 
unsupervised environment, outside the purview of scrutineers, which may diminish the 
latter’s sense of their ability to be directly satisfied that votes have been cast without any 
intimidation, coercion or corruption.  This is also true of postal voting, and this factor will 
therefore be of lesser significance if remote internet voting is merely used as a substitute 
for postal voting.  It will become more salient if the availability of internet voting has the 
effect of stimulating more people to vote in an unsupervised environment. 
Ballot interface 
2.9 With kiosk, mobile or remote internet voting, the voter records his or her vote on an 
electronic device, rather than a ballot paper.  This gives rise to both opportunities and 
challenges. 
■ The interface may be enhanced to better meet the needs of specific groups of 
voters.  Blind and low vision voters may be given the capacity to vote without 
assistance, as discussed at paragraphs 6.6 to 6.10 below.  Access may be 
provided to multilingual instructions, possibly in audio form or even video form, for 
the benefit of voters who cannot read.  Multilingual text instructions are currently a 
feature of Elections ACT electronic voting system.  Candidates’ how-to-vote 
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recommendations may be able to be provided to voters who otherwise could not 
access them.  Other mooted design ideas include the options of translations 
appearing above the digitally displayed ballot papers.  The possibilities offered by 
enhanced interfaces are significant from an enfranchisement perspective.  
■ EMBs may however face a challenge in designing an interface which reflects what 
are often seen as the desirable (or even essential) features of a ballot paper.  Over 
the years much effort has gone into subtle design features of paper ballots, 
including the random ordering of candidates or groups, or the rotational printing of 
ballots; and these features are typically aimed at achieving the specific objective of 
enhancing the neutrality of the ballot, and eliminating or reducing the impact of so-
called “positional voting” effects (such as the “donkey vote”).   
■ Large ballot papers such as those often used for single transferable vote 
proportional representation can be especially difficult to replicate in an electronic 
context, particularly if voters are using small devices such as tablets or mobile 
phones as their mode of internet access.  (It might, for example, seem reasonable 
to suggest that Senate voters could be asked if they wished to vote “above-the-
line” or “below-the-line”, and then be presented with an appropriate representation 
of the relevant part of the ballot paper.  This, however, could well give rise to 
reasonable protests from ungrouped candidates or candidates without a box 
above the line, who could complain that it would be possible for someone to vote 
without ever being shown their names on the ballot.) 
Formality checking 
2.10 Kiosk, mobile or remote internet voting can be configured so as to maximise formal 
voting.  
■ The system may be configured to ensure that accidental numbering errors cannot 
be made.  In most computerised systems of preferential voting, the voter clicks 
successively against individual candidates, and the system allocates the next 
available preference with each such click. 
■ Alternatively, the system may permit the voter to insert numbers, but be 
programmed to provide a warning message if the numbers so inserted are 
defective. 
Email voting does not have this feature. 
Timing of internet voting 
2.11 Electronic transmission of ballot information has the potential to make it possible to 
remove some of the time constraints which are inherent in the main current form of remote 
voting, postal voting.  Voters, being no longer dependent on postal services (possibly of 
 Page 17    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
two different countries) to either receive or return their ballots, may be able to vote from 
shortly after the close of nominations until the close of the poll.9   
Geographical coverage 
2.12 For many voters, remote internet voting or email voting has the potential to provide 
better geographical coverage than postal voting, enabling them to vote with ease in a 
much wider range of places (potentially anywhere that an appropriate internet connection 
can be accessed).  This effect is only likely to increase over time, as postal services are 
wound back in response to a decreased demand for standard letter services.10  This 
benefit extends beyond jurisdictional borders and EMBs have reported difficulties in 
providing and receiving voting and ballot materials overseas due to transit delays and tight 
legislative timelines. 
Re-voting 
2.13 A fundamentally distinctive feature of some models of internet voting is their ability 
to permit people who have cast an internet vote to re-vote, over-riding their earlier vote(s).  
In these cases, an EMB is required to connect an elector's identity with their original vote 
in some way, which is not currently legal in Australia and would need to be considered for 
any future legislative change. Some argue that re-voting provides a degree of protection 
to persons using remote internet voting or email voting who may have felt pressured or 
coerced to cast an earlier vote in conflict with their true preferences.  The extraction of 
earlier votes in an electronic environment is simpler than when paper ballots are involved, 
and is facilitated in countries where a common system, such as a national identity card, 
can be used online and at polling places for confirming the identities of all voters 
definitively. 
Separation of the processes of voter identification and voting 
2.14 When voting takes place at a polling place, the process of identifying the elector 
and confirming his or her right to vote by reference to a roll is manifestly separated from 
the process of marking and casting the vote.  This can be replicated at kiosk or mobile 
internet voting, but in the case of email voting and remote internet voting, the separation 
of the vote from the particulars of the elector who cast it is unlikely to be immediately 
visible to the voter, nor is it capable of being directly observed by scrutineers in the way in 
which the separation of postal ballot papers from declaration envelopes can be observed. 
                                               
9 The precise definition of the last time at which a person is permitted to cast an internet vote is an 
important detail to be addressed if voters are spread over multiple time zones, as could often be 
the case. 
10 Internet voting gives rise to the possibility that the internet protocol (IP) address of the computer 
used to transmit a vote may be recorded.  It is worth noting, however, that such addresses can be 
an unreliable guide to the exact geographical location of the voter. 
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Registration for internet voting 
2.15 Most models of internet voting require the potential voter to undertake a specific 
process of registration, separate from normal electoral enrolment.  This may be configured 
so as to require proof of identity beyond what is normally required when casting a vote at 
a polling place.  An alternative would be to treat all voters as potential internet voters, and 
provide them up-front with some sort of credential which they could use to vote.11    
Confirmation that a vote has been properly processed 
2.16 It is often argued to be desirable, not least to build confidence in a new internet 
voting system in the short term, that individual voters should be able to confirm that their 
internet votes have been properly processed; and various different schemes, reflecting 
different philosophies and perceptions of risk, have been proposed or adopted to this end.  
Some involve enabling a voter to access the database of votes already cast and to be 
advised of the preferences which he or she has recorded.  Such methods of access may 
be supplemented by the use of cryptographic techniques to ensure that any such data will 
be meaningful to the voter but not to anyone else, so that potential vote buyers or voter 
intimidators will not be able to be given evidence that their tactics have succeeded.12  
Mechanisms of this type will normally be supplemented by specialised processes for 
auditing the way in which the system handles votes which have been cast. 
2.17 Such processes differ fundamentally from those applicable at polling places, where 
the vote is intended to become anonymous at the moment it is cast, and confirmation of 
its correct inclusion in the count comes from the handling of ballot boxes and papers 
according to prescribed procedures under the gaze of scrutineers. 
Cost issues 
2.18 Once an internet voting system is put in place, the unit cost of each vote cast is 
likely to be substantially lower than the unit cost of ordinary or postal votes (which 
includes postage, printing and preliminary scrutiny costs).  However, more evidence is 
required to substantiate any argument regarding costs.  With email voting the voter must 
print the ballot paper at his or her own expense, while with kiosk, mobile or remote 
                                               
11 In the Australian context, this could give rise to major potential problems if implemented for 
remote internet voting, flowing from its interaction with compulsory voting.  At House of 
Representatives elections turnout is typically of the order of 95%.  Research conducted by 
Jackman (1999) suggests that in the absence of compulsory voting, turnout would be in the range 
from 55% to 70%.  This suggests that more than 25% of enrolled voters are only weakly engaged 
with the voting process.  In such an environment, the possibility that large numbers of credentials 
distributed for the purposes of internet voting could be handed over to other people to be used for 
voting to ensure that the elector would not be penalised for failure to vote does not seem especially 
implausible. 
12 It is sometimes argued that efforts so to obscure evidence of voting in a particular way are 
rendered otiose by (i) the use of unsupervised postal voting; and (ii) the possibility that cameras 
(perhaps built into smartphones) may be used to photograph computer screens on which votes are 
being cast, or even marked ballot papers. 
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internet voting, there is often no printed ballot at all.  This however is but one element of 
the potential costs of internet voting, a topic addressed further in Part 7 below. 
3. Historical background 
3.1 This Part outlines how Australia’s electoral processes have evolved, noting in 
particular that over time the ways in which a vote can be cast have expanded to cater for 
the needs of electors for whom voting at a polling place was not a feasible or convenient 
option.  It explores previous Australian experience with electronic voting and the analysis 
thereof.  Finally, it briefly flags experience in a number of other countries which have 
adopted or trialled internet voting processes. 
The evolution of Australia’s voting processes 
3.2 Australia’s electoral authorities, from their earliest days, have been faced with 
major challenges arising from the country’s geography and population distribution, and 
have responded to them through the use of a range of different voting modalities. 
■ At the time of federation, almost 50% of the Australian population lived in 
communities of less than 3,000 people. 
■ For a prolonged period, road networks outside major centres were rudimentary 
compared with today, relatively few people owned cars, aviation was non-existent 
or in its infancy, and railways and coastal shipping were the primary means of 
long-distance travel. 
■ Telecommunications were also very limited, with telegraph being used (at some 
expense) for urgent messages. 
■ The Post Office was the face of the federal government in most communities.   
3.3 These challenges relating to communications and travel inevitably meant that the 
basic model of voting at a polling place on election day would have to be supplemented to 
cater for persons unable (for legitimate reasons) to attend, and postal voting was the 
mechanism chosen for that purpose.13  As originally prescribed in the Commonwealth 
Electoral Act 1902,  however, postal voting was very clearly defined as an exceptional 
arrangement applicable to limited classes of voters, and the authorised witness to the 
recording of postal votes played a role much more burdened with responsibilities than is 
the case today.14   
                                               
13 Proxy voting, a mechanism used in some countries to enfranchise (in some sense) those who 
cannot attend a polling place is precluded at federal elections in Australia by the prohibition on 
plural voting in sections 8 and 30 of the Constitution. 
14 The authorised witness had to be drawn from prescribed classes of people apparently deemed to 
be respectable, and was charged, under pain of possible imprisonment, with seeing that the 
prescribed processes for postal voting were “complied with by every elector voting by post before 
him, and by every person present when the elector votes”.  In that respect, the authorised witness 
 Page 20    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
3.4 Since then, there has been a general pattern of providing more diverse 
opportunities for people to vote at the federal level. 
■ The deployment of large numbers of Australian military personnel overseas during 
the First World War made it necessary to develop ways for them to vote, and 
similar mechanisms were adopted during the Second World War and the Korean 
War. 
■ By 1918, provision had also been made for absent voting at polling places outside 
an elector’s enrolled division. 
■ Postal voting has been extended outside Australia, being now provided through 
Australian diplomatic missions (with postal votes being able to be issued and 
returned through them). 
■ Pre-poll voting has been made available at designated centres from shortly after 
the close of nominations, and since 2010, no declaration envelope has been 
required for persons voting within their enrolled division. 
■ Mobile polling facilities have since 1984 been provided in hospitals and nursing 
homes, and in remote areas. 
■ Also since 1984, voting facilities have been provided at Australian stations in 
Antarctica.   
3.5 These changes have been inspired by societal needs which reflected broader 
changes in the community.  In particular, people are more mobile, with an inclination both 
to travel (in Australia and overseas), and to change their places of living.15  In addition, the 
introduction of compulsory voting, and a greater appreciation of the rights of groups with 
special needs, have motivated EMBs in Australia to attempt to ensure that people are not 
effectively disenfranchised by mechanical aspects of the voting process.  
Previous Australasian experience with electronic voting  
3.6 A number of Australasia’s EMBs have implemented or trialled systems involving 
remote access technology or electronic voting.  A brief chronology is set out below.16 
1996 - New Zealand 
3.7 In 1996 New Zealand introduced the return of ballot papers by facsimile for voters 
who were overseas. This represented the first use of technology-assisted voting in the 
Asia/Pacific region.  Since 2002 overseas  voters have been able to use the internet to 
download the  ballot paper, declaration and supporting documentation in the three weeks 
prior to polling day.  Completed votes can  be returned by fax or mail or to an overseas 
                                                                                                                                              
played an official role akin to that of a polling official at a polling place, and contributed at least to 
some extent to the fostering of trust in the process. 
15 This issue is further discussed at paragraphs 3.47 and 4.3 to 4.7 below. 
16 Further detail regarding some of the initiatives discussed below is set out in Holmes (2012). 
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post.  This initiative was well patronised in its time, but changes in the availability of fax 
machines have led to a decline in use of this method for the return of voting papers. 
2001 - The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
3.8 Electronic voting was first implemented at a public election in Australia by the ACT 
Electoral Commission, which provided a kiosk system, not connected to the internet, at 
the 2001 Legislative Assembly elections.  The model used involves the voter being 
marked off the roll before moving to a voting machine to vote.  The voter is given a 
barcode or “token” to open a voting session on the machine for his or her electorate.  The 
vote is stored within the polling place on a server until the close of the polls.  The votes 
are then imported into an electronic counting system.  The system also makes it possible 
for the voter to use headphones, to assist people with a print handicap to navigate the 
screen and cast their votes independently.  The ACT has used the same system with 
minor improvements for four elections.  Approximately 58,000 voters - around 25% of 
those who voted - used this mechanism at the 2012 elections. 
2006 - Tasmania 
3.9 In 2006 the Tasmanian Electoral Commission (TEC) implemented a kiosk based 
system that had been developed in-house.  This system facilitated the marking of 
preferences on the ballot paper, was targeted at voters who are blind or have low vision 
(BLV) (providing audio guidance if needed and a tailored tactile keypad), but was also 
available for use by all Tasmanian voters.  At the end of each voting session, the recorded 
ballot was printed and placed in the ballot box. 
2006 - Victoria 
3.10 In 2006 the Victorian Electoral Commission (VEC) implemented a system based 
on kiosk style voting machines, which was designed for, and only permitted to be used by, 
the BLV community.  The system featured audio guidance and a tactile numerical keypad.  
The voter’s name was marked on the roll, and then a smart card was provided, which had 
to be inserted into the voting machine in order to display the correct ballots for that voter.  
Votes were stored within each voting machine until the close of polling, when the 
preferences were downloaded and transported to a central location for printing and 
inclusion in the count. 
3.11 In 2010 the VEC built upon on that implementation to include telephone voting 
within the polling place, and located some kiosks in London to help with the return of 
ballots promptly.  The 2010 implementation catered not only for the BLV community, but 
also for the Culturally and Linguistically Diverse, and for ordinary overseas voters who 
could attend the London pre-poll voting centre.  The system provided audio and screen 
guidance in multiple languages, along with a telephone style keypad (the use of which 
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flowed from the successful use of such an interface device by the AEC in 2007).  At the 
end of the poll, all votes cast were printed and included in the count. 
2007 - The Commonwealth 
3.12 In Chapter 11 of its report on the 2004 federal election17, the Federal Parliament’s 
Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) recommended that remote 
electronic voting be considered for certain classes of voters including BLV electors and 
Defence personnel serving overseas.  In 2006, the federal government responded to the 
JSCEM report and stated that a trial of electronically assisted voting for BLV voters and a 
remote electronic voting trial for Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel would be 
undertaken for the 2007 federal election.  The ADF trial was to be subject to a satisfactory 
resolution of systems and associated security issues. 
BLV voters 
3.13 The BLV trial was restricted in scope to 30 pre-poll voting sites, and to electors 
who were sight impaired such that they were unable to vote without assistance.  The 
kiosks were available in the pre-poll voting period, and on polling day.  The government 
also required that the output from the kiosks be a printed record for later inclusion in the 
count. 
3.14 The solution adopted was designed by a Canberra software provider and was 
based on a desktop computer format, with a 21-inch flat screen monitor, a telephone style 
keypad and earphones.  The computer box was encased in a tamper-evident perspex 
case.  While voters with some sight could be guided through the voting process using the 
information on screen, those without sight needed comprehensive instructional voice 
scripts to guide them.  The instructional scripts were recorded during development of the 
system, but candidate names and party affiliation information could only be recorded after 
the close of nominations.   
3.15. The kiosk system facilitated the vote only, and did not store any vote data on the 
computer.  To meet the requirement of a printed output for each ballot, and to avoid 
anyone seeing the content of the printed output in the polling place, the voter’s 
preferences were printed in a two dimensional barcode.  This printed vote record was then 
placed in a pre-poll declaration envelope and placed in the pre-poll ballot box.  After 
preliminary scrutiny and the close of the poll, the envelopes were opened and the vote 
records extracted and decoded for inclusion in the count. 
3.16 A total of 850 votes were cast over 29 locations during the two week voting period.  
The kiosk was the first of its kind to use a telephone style keypad interface, which drew 
parallels with the rules of telephone banking.  This bridged the gap between voters who 
                                               
17 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2005). 
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were unfamiliar with using a computer but were familiar with telephones, ATMs or 
telephone banking.  The trial demonstrated that electronic voting for the BLV community 
could provide an intuitive, secure, secret and independent method of voting  It also 
highlighted that an “audio assisted voting system” could potentially provide benefits for 
any voter who requires assistance with the printed ballot format. 
ADF Remote Electronic Voting 
3.17 The ADF voting trial was conducted on the Defence Restricted Network (DRN) and 
was not available on the World Wide Web.  A secure software environment for voting was 
therefore created.  As a consequence, the trial was restricted to those overseas ADF 
personnel who had access to the DRN and who would be serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Timor-Leste or Solomon Islands at the time of the election.  The trial specifically excluded 
Her Majesty’s Australian Ships due to bandwidth and connectivity constraints. 
3.18 The AEC and Defence were engaged throughout the application design process.  
This ensured that the design met all security and policy requirements, and complied with 
Australian federal electoral law and with DRN standards, protocols and constraints.  The 
AEC and Defence undertook a comprehensive system acceptance process prior to 
deployment into production.  Both agencies confirmed in October 2007 that the 
information system and support procedures were ready for the 2007 federal election. 
3.19 One element of the design was the provision to the voter of a receipt number 
which could be entered into a web screen to enable confirmation to be given that the vote 
had been received and included in the count.   
3.20 In all, 2,012 voters were registered, representing 80% of those eligible to 
participate in the trial.  Of those, 1,511 voters, or 75%, used the remote electronic voting 
system.  Electronically submitted votes were printed following polling day, and dispatched 
to the relevant divisions for counting. 
Subsequent developments 
3.21 Both systems were audited by a National Association of Testing Authorities 
accredited firm post-development, and were certified as having met all requirements.  
However, as discussed at paragraph 3.33 below, following the successful implementation 
of these trials, the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters chose to not 
recommend their continuation, primarily due to cost.  
2010 - Tasmania 
3.22 In 2010 the TEC introduced a new process called Express Voting for voters who 
are overseas or in remote areas.  Under this scheme, an approved voter receives his or 
her ballot paper and a special declaration form by fax or email.  The voter then completes 
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both the ballot paper and declaration form, and returns them by fax, email or post.  In 
2010 754 express votes were issued, with 576 returned in time to be counted. 
2011 - New South Wales 
3.23 In 2011 the NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) successfully implemented a 
remote telephone and internet voting system known as iVote.  This was the first of its kind 
used in Australia, and allowed voters to register on the internet or by phone to utilise the 
system.  Initially this system targeted BLV voters, voters who were disabled within the 
meaning of applicable anti-discrimination legislation, and voters who were more than 20 
kms from a polling place on polling day.  Eligibility was later expanded to include any voter 
who was not within NSW on polling day.  The telephone voting channel was the first to be 
implemented based on the first Australian Electoral Industry Standard “Automated 
Telephone Voting”.18  More than 51,000 voters registered for the iVote service and nearly 
47,000 of them voted.  Of those who voted, 1.43% qualified to use the service by virtue of 
being blind or vision impaired; 2.77% because of other disabilities; 3.51% because they 
lived in remote rural areas; and 92.3% because they were outside NSW (Allen Consulting 
Group (2011, p. 20)).  All votes taken were stored in central servers in two data centres.  
At the close of the poll the votes were printed and included in the count at the electoral 
district level.  The iVote system has been successfully used at a number of by-elections 
since the 2011 State election, most recently that held for the District of Northern 
Tablelands on 25 May 2013.  
Significant previous analysis of the issue of internet voting  
3.24 Internet or networked voting mechanisms have been addressed in Australia in 
various reports, over a long period.  Again, a brief chronology is set out below. 
1979 - Australian Electoral Office review 
3.25 The possible use of electronic voting in Australia was under discussion well before 
the personal computer became an entrenched feature of daily life.  The Australian 
                                               
18 Electoral Council of Australia (2011).  With the implementation of several kiosk systems aimed at 
the BLV voter, it had been noted that the interface for using these systems varied widely between 
each implementation.  After consultation with the blindness and disability sector it was agreed that 
a telephone style keypad was the easiest for voters to navigate, and that a telephone voting 
standard, similar to that adopted by the banking sector for their telephone banking systems, should 
be developed to provide the voter with a similar intuitive interface for all parliamentary elections.  
ECANZ members therefore collaborated to develop the first Australian electoral standard.  The 
Automated Telephone Voting Standard was implemented in the iVote project in 2011 and reviewed 
to include the lessons learned from that implementation.  It was re-endorsed by the ECA in late 
2011, and was also reflected in the Vote Assist electronic voting system developed by the WAEC 
and utilised at their 2013 State general election.  It will also be reflected in the systems being 
developed by the VEC for the 2014 State election.   
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Electoral Office (1979), in an internal review of Commonwealth electoral legislation as it 
then stood, foreshadowed the possibility of mechanisms remarkably similar to some of 
those discussed above: 
“A master ballot paper could be incorporated into each polling booth.  (It could be much 
larger than those used at present, thereby assisting electors with failing eyesight.)  The 
squares opposite each candidate (or party if such an alternative were accepted), much like 
the buttons in modern automatic lifts, could be made pressure-sensitive.  Rather than 
actually writing his numbered preference in each square, the elector could then simply 
touch each square in the order of his preference (which would then light up indicating the 
number of that preference, resembling a filled-in ballot paper).”. 
1983 - Consideration by the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Reform 
of proposals to vote “through the TAB” or through ATM networks 
3.26 Early public debate tended to focus on the prospect of using the TAB computer 
network as a voting platform.  A 1983 submission to the Federal Parliament’s Joint Select 
Committee on Electoral Reform from Messrs R.R. Miller and R.B. Thomas argued for 
such a model, asserting that its use could reduce the per voter cost of an election from 
$1.00 to $0.20c, and that election results would be available within one hour of the close 
of the polls.  In conclusion, they noted that: 
“The above concepts have been tailored to suit existing systems available in Australia 
today and no new development of technology or machinery is required.  In fact, the 
available systems used by the T.A.Bs throughout Australia, with their corresponding 
networks, mean a fully computerised election is only months away from reality.  In the 
future, the introduction of the push button telephone system will enable the idea of voting 
by telephone and registering the vote directly to take place without any human interface at 
all.”. 
3.27 The Committee, in its First Report, was not inclined to adopt the proposal put to it, 
but nevertheless left the door open for further consideration of the issue: 
“… while the retention of the preferential voting system would involve a more involved 
ballot paper …computer voting would be possible in Australia.  However, the application of 
computer technology in Australia is not recommended at this stage.  The Committee 
believes that the level of computer education among electors would need to be high to 
overcome the complications of a computer ballot paper.  Also, extensive as the TAB 
network may be, there are vast area of Australia without ready access to the facility.  The 
accepted pattern of Australian elections is that they be held on Saturdays (as provided in 
the Commonwealth Electoral Act) when the TAB is in peak us, and the system does on 
occasions break down.  The present system has in its favour a close degree of 
supervision, which might not be possible with computerisation.  However, with developing 
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computer-consumer education and the spread of technology, the Committee recommends 
that the proposal should be kept in mind.”.19 
2002 - eVolution not revolution 
3.28 In 2002, the AEC and the VEC collaborated in the preparation of a report entitled 
eVolution not revolution.20  This report has largely stood the test of time in its description 
of electronic voting methods and its associated observations.  It highlighted that electronic 
voting would be of most benefit to those who have difficulty in accessing a polling place, 
such as voters in the Antarctic, and those otherwise overseas or in remote locations.  It 
also flagged potential benefits for voters with a print handicap who would otherwise need 
to be assisted to complete their ballots, thereby compromising the secrecy and 
independence of their votes.  The report encouraged public debate on the crucial issues 
of the secrecy of the vote, equal access to voting, security issues and public trust and 
confidence in the voting systems.   
3.29 The report concluded that it was time for electoral laws to be amended to enable 
trialling of electronic voting specifically for those key groups of people who were often 
disenfranchised by distance or disability, and encouraged Parliaments to address the 
issue. 
2008 - Evaluation of the 2007 AEC trials, and consideration by the Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 
3.30 An independent auditor was contracted by the AEC to evaluate the 2007 trials.21  
The overall assessment was that the AEC had complied with legislation and relevant 
standards as well as effectively managing electoral risks. 
3.31 In relation to kiosk voting by BLV voters the report included the following findings. 
■ The voters were likely to be younger than the average BLV person, with the older 
electronic voting machine (EVM) voters more likely to require assistance to vote 
using the EVMs. 
■ Those who either did not use computers, or did so infrequently, found the kiosk 
harder to use, adding weight to the need for greater means to become more 
familiar with the technology. 
■ Amongst the kiosk users, the support for the kiosks was overwhelmingly very 
positive, with 97% of users stating that they were (very) satisfied overall.  
                                               
19 Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform (1983, pp. 69-70). 
20 Victorian Electoral Commission and Australian Electoral Commission (2002).  
21 Sue Sheridan and Associates (2008a); Sue Sheridan and Associates (2008b). 
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■ Those who used the machines were able to vote in a way to reflect their intentions, 
as evinced by the relatively high number of below the line (BTL) voters for the 
Senate.  
3.32 In relation to ADF voting the report included the following findings. 
■ The trial significantly increased the number of ADF personnel voting. 
■ The registration process was resource intensive for the AEC. 
■ The timeliness of receiving mail was an issue for some of the Defence personnel 
overseas.   
■ Amongst the ADF voters, there was a high level of satisfaction with the level of 
service that the voting system provided.  
■ The main issues raised concerned the lack of privacy in casting a vote (16 survey 
respondents), and the speed at which voters were able to log on and cast their 
votes. 
■ Despite the concerns about speed from respondents, the average time to cast a 
vote was 8.6 minutes after logging on. 
■ Those who used the system to vote were able to vote in a way that reflected their 
intentions, as evinced by the relatively high number of BTL voters for the Senate. 
3.33 Following the 2007 election, the JSCEM undertook a separate review of the BLV 
and ADF electronic voting trials, and recommended that the processes trialled should not 
be used at future elections.  The wording of the Committee’s recommendations placed 
major emphasis on cost factors: 
“Given the additional burden imposed by remote electronic voting with its paper-based 
backup systems on defence force personnel in operational areas and the relatively high 
average cost of voting at $1,159 per vote compared to an average cost per elector of $8.36 
at the 2007 federal election, the committee recommends that remote electronic voting for 
defence force personnel should not be continued at future federal elections. 
... 
Given the high average cost per vote of $2,597 for electronically assisted voting compared 
to an average cost per elector of $8.36 at the 2007 federal election and a concern that 
participation will not increase to sustainable levels, the committee recommends that 
electronically assisted voting for electors who are blind or have low vision should not be 
continued at future federal elections.”.22 
                                               
22 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2009a, pp. xiv, xvi). 
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2009 onwards - Reports associated with the introduction of internet voting in 
NSW 
3.34 In the lead up to and following the introduction of iVote in NSW, the NSWEC 
commissioned and published a number of substantial reports.23 
3.35 In 2009 Associate Professor Rodney Smith, of the University of Sydney’s 
Department of Government and International Relations, prepared a report entitled 
International Experiences of Electronic Voting and Their Implications for New South 
Wales.24  The report detailed case studies from Brazil, India, Switzerland, Estonia and the 
Netherlands, and provided comparisons with several Westminster systems (New Zealand, 
Canada and the United Kingdom), followed by separate commentary on the experience of 
the USA.  It noted that while Brazil, India, Switzerland and Estonia had all retained 
electronic voting, other countries had had mixed experiences leading to either the 
abandonment of implementation plans, the abandonment of existing implementations, or 
the reduction of the use of electronic voting, particularly internet voting.  Professor Smith’s 
paper reached no firm conclusions, but included an observation that more extensive 
research on public attitudes to electronic voting would be an important early step for the 
NSWEC.  
3.36 In the aftermath of the State General Election in 2011, the NSWEC sponsored an 
evaluation of the use of the iVote process,25 the primary conclusions of which were as 
follows: 
“The iVote system has been proven to work and be appropriate in a real election 
environment.  It provided a convenient, reliable and secure method of voting in the 2011 
NSW SGE [State General Election] for people who are blind or vision impaired, have a 
disability, live in remote or rural areas or who were outside NSW on Election Day. 
The take-up of the iVote system was highly successful.  A total of 51,103 people registered 
to use iVote and a total of 46,864 (or 92 per cent) actually used it to cast their votes in the 
2011 NSW SGE.  The actual number of users was in the order of four times the original 
estimates.  
- The blind or vision impaired group and the group of electors with other disabilities 
experienced lower than estimated take-up rates, with only 2,000 people from these 
groups casting their vote using iVote. 
- The registrations and votes received from people in remote or rural areas 
exceeded original take-up estimates by almost three fold. 
                                               
23 New South Wales Electoral Commission (2013a).  The issue of internet voting has also received 
sustained attention from the NSW Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. 
24 Smith (2009). 
25 Allen Consulting Group (2011). 
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- The vast majority of iVote registrants and users were people outside the State on 
Election Day. 
The above suggests that the success of iVote (in terms of its uptake) was mainly driven by 
people who used it because they were outside of NSW on Election Day.”. 
3.37 Most recently, the NSWEC has published a further paper by Professor Smith on 
Internet Voting and Voter Interference.26 
2009 - Electoral Reform Green Paper 
3.38 The Australian Government’s 2009 Electoral Reform Green Paper addressed 
internet voting at paragraphs 11.38 to 11.41, as follows:27 
“11.38 Internet voting is one electronic voting option.  The most common internet voting 
proposal entails eligible voters being sent identity and password details which enable 
them to remotely log onto a designated internet voting site to cast their vote.  
11.39 A number of arguments have been advanced in favour of internet voting.  It has been 
said that voting using the internet at home would allow for ‘greater deliberation than 
occurs currently at some public polling stations’.  It has also been argued that internet 
voting would remove the existing logistical difficulties inherent in postal voting, and 
would also provide a forum through which overseas voters could cast their votes in a 
more efficient and convenient manner.  Both these outcomes could achieve 
administrative savings.  It has also been contended that internet voting may improve the 
participation of young people in the electoral process.  From a ‘proof of identity’ 
perspective, internet voting without ‘proof of identity’ requirements could be regarded as 
comparable to in-person voting without ‘proof of identity’ requirements. 
11.40 However, internet voting raises a number of additional security concerns compared to 
other forms of electronic voting.  For example, it has been argued that: 
• an internet voting system may be vulnerable to outside attack; 
• there may be an increased possibility for voter fraud given that voting no longer 
takes place in a controlled impartial environment; 
• in the absence of a national identity system, proving voter identity in the case of 
internet voting is a major security issue; and 
• there would be a possibility for widespread ‘flooding’ of the internet voting site, 
leading to system failures. 
11.41 In addition, it has been argued that it would be almost impossible to ensure the secrecy 
of the ballot, as there would be ‘potential for coercion and intimidation when voting in an 
                                               
26 Smith (2013). 
27 Australian Government (2009).  Footnotes in the original text have been deleted. 
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unsupervised setting.’  If other options for voting (such as postal voting) were not 
retained, there would also be potential for discrimination against those who do not have 
access to the internet or are not proficient in its use.”.  
2012 - AEC examination of attitudes to internet voting 
3.39 In 2012 an internal AEC paper produced by the Strategic Research and Analysis 
Section28 examined research conducted on the use of the internet for voting overseas, the 
limited experiences within Australia of voting via the internet, and the trends towards the 
use by Australians of online services in the context of other government services and 
online banking.  The paper, entitled Internet Voting: One small click for the elector, One 
giant leap for the electoral process, approaches the subject by focusing on three areas 
considered vital to the electronic voting experience - convenience, trust and secrecy - and 
contemplating how they might be achieved in the context of internet voting.  
3.40 The paper highlighted the following points. 
■ Trials of internet voting overseas have given rise to both positive and negative 
experiences.  
■ An element of the successes was the involvement of electoral stakeholders: 
typically, parliamentary, government, corporate and specific community interest 
groups.  
■ The general public’s views on internet voting in Australia have largely been 
neglected.  Arguments against internet voting have tended to assume that the 
public holds a preference for voting via the internet because it would be 
convenient, and that the public has simplistic views concerning online transactional 
services. 
3.41 The paper accordingly sought to determine how the public may perceive an 
internet based voting system.  It examined the recent substantial growth in government 
services being delivered online, which has not been uniformly distributed across the 
population, since people’s preference to use online services decreases when the 
demographic is older.  It noted that this “digital divide” is also influenced, but to a lesser 
extent, by education levels and income.  Internet banking reflects a similar age-based 
result with young people the most common users of online banking.  It noted that a study 
conducted in 2010 directly addressed the public’s attitude to online voting: just over half 
the surveyed group thought that online voting would make the process easier; at the same 
time over a quarter of the group thought it would be more difficult than paper-based 
voting.  
                                               
28 Australian Electoral Commission (2012). 
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3.42 The paper noted that a challenge for voting via the internet is maintaining the 
current level of trust the public has in the Australia’s electoral system.  On this, it cites the 
evaluation of iVote following the 2011 SGE in NSW (Allen Consulting Group (2011)) as 
finding that only a small percentage of iVote users expressed distrust with the registration 
process, while 3% of those who chose not to use iVote did not trust technology assisted 
voting.  It noted that the vote checking service, which allowed voters to ascertain that their 
vote had been lodged, of the ADF voting system trialled at the 2007 federal election had 
been used by only a small percentage of electors, despite the fact that three-quarters 
considered it a good feature, suggesting that the presence of this feature increased 
people’s trust.  
3.43 The paper reached the following conclusions. 
■ It is still undetermined how Australians’ increased access to the internet will affect 
their trust in voting online.  There have been findings that indicate that the public 
are more likely to access “informational” services than to perform more complex 
transactions that involve exchanging funds and personal details. 
■ Australian’s attitude towards the secrecy of the vote is also difficult to gauge.  BLV 
electors have indicated on numerous occasions that it was very important that they 
be given the opportunity to cast a secret vote, but this can be compared with the 
openness of citizens who engage on social networking sites, and the increase in 
postal voting. 
3.44 In summary, the paper noted how little research has been done on public opinion 
regarding internet voting, and suggested that this be pursued further. 
2012 - Electoral Council of Australia (ECA) Electronic Voting Workshop 
3.45 In July 2012 the VEC and the AEC collaborated through the ECA to conduct the 
first national workshop on electronic voting in Australia, held over three days in 
Melbourne.  In the light of growing commentary from academic computer scientists before 
parliamentary committees concerning the security of electronic voting solutions, a need 
had been perceived for ECA members to know more about the security risks surrounding 
electronic voting and verified voting methods.  The workshop was designed to consult with 
a range of academics and election administrators. 
2012 - VEC development of a system based on the “Prêt à Voter” model 
3.46 The VEC is currently pursuing the development of a kiosk system, a verifiable 
voting protocol based on the “Prêt à Voter” model, with modifications to deal with 
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distinctive features of Victorian elections.29  The development is proceeding in close 
cooperation with computer scientists who have been engaged for some time in 
researching technical implementation of cryptographic methods which underpin some of 
the more sophisticated approaches to internet voting.  
2013 - Voting by “Fly In, Fly Out” (FIFO) workers 
3.47 In recent times Australia has seen a growth in the phenomenon of FIFO workers, 
who, once located in their work place, cannot leave until their shift ends (often locking 
them in place for two or three weeks).  In February 2013 the House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Regional Australia recommended that the Commonwealth 
Government should charge the AEC with developing an electronic voting system for FIFO 
workers.30  Further details are set out in Appendix A. 
2013 – WAEC post-election survey of electors 
3.48 In April 2013, the WAEC published a report on its survey of voters from the 2013 
State election.31  Participants were surveyed on several topics including on their attitudes 
towards electronic voting. The survey found that nearly three-quarters of respondents 
used the internet for the following types of transactions: paying bills; online banking; online 
shopping; and government information or services.  Participants were also surveyed on 
their perception of how secure internet voting was; the number who felt secure or very 
secure in voting via the internet increased from approximately one-third in 2005 to nearly 
half in 2013.  When asked if they would use internet voting, if the process was offered and 
secure, two-thirds felt it was likely or very likely that they would use the service.  The 
public’s level of trust in the WAEC in conducting an election which allowed voting via the 
internet increased from half feeling secure in them conducting this form of election in 2005 
to nearly two-thirds in 2013. 
Other consideration 
3.49 Holmes (2012) outlines a number of other reports from Australian EMBs or 
parliamentary bodies which refer to the issues of electronic or internet voting.  Appendix 
A provides more detailed information. 
International experience 
3.50 The most recent comprehensive comparative survey of international experience 
with remote internet voting is that undertaken by Barrat i Esteve, Goldsmith and Turner 
(2012, pp. 12-68).  They highlight the following ten cases of internet voting “from 
                                               
29 For an overview of the VEC’s plans, see Victorian Electoral Commission (2013, pp. 11-19, 21-
22).  For more technical discussions of the Prêt à Voter model as it might be used in Victoria, see 
Burton et al (2012a) and Burton et al (2012b). 
30 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia (2013). 
31 Report on the West Australian Electoral Commission Survey – State General Election 2013. 
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uncontrolled environments” (as they define the term), in addition to the Norwegian poll 
which is the main subject of their study. 
Country Classification Type of Elections in which Internet 
Voting is Used 
Australia 
 
Currently used in some parts 
of the country 





Currently used in some parts 
of the country 
Local government elections 
Estonia Currently used nationwide 
 
Local government elections, 
Parliamentary elections, Presidential 




Currently used in parts of the 
country 
Elections to the Assembly of French 
Citizens Living Abroad 
 




Water Board Councils and National 
Parliament (overseas voters only) 
Norway Pilots ongoing Local government elections 
 




Currently used in parts of the 
country 
 
Municipal, cantonal and federal 
Referenda 
United Kingdom Piloted and not continued Local government elections 
 
United States Pilots ongoing General elections (overseas voters, 
predominantly military) 
 
They note, furthermore, that the use of internet voting for binding votes or referendums is 
a comparatively recent phenomenon, being first attempted in a small trial in the USA in 
2000, involving only 84 participating voters. 
4. The electoral environment in Australasia 
4.1 This Part deals with aspects of the environment in which elections are conducted 
which could be expected to have an impact on the feasibility or desirability of adopting 
different models of internet voting.  It covers the following matters: 
■ issues raised in the AEC Environmental Scan 2009-2012; 
■ population mobility, including overseas; 
■ the changing nature of the printing industry and postal services; 
                                               
32 Barrat i Esteve, Goldsmith and Turner (2012) state that “…it has not been possible to find out 
any information on the internet voting system trialled in India beyond vague media reports”. 
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■ the nature of campaigning;  
■ the rise of the internet; 
■ increased commercially-available internet voting for private and fee-for-service 
(FFS) elections and other ballots; 
■ public attitudes to, and trust in, internet voting, the election process and EMBs;  
■ attitudes to risk; and  
■ diversity of electoral processes in a federal system. 
AEC environmental scan 
4.2 In 2009, the AEC prepared a document entitled AEC Environmental Scan 2009-
2012,33 which sought to identify a range of factors which could influence the way in which 
the organisation operates.  Some key points identified therein as at 2009 included the 
following. 
■ In the decade preceding the Scan, the number of Australian households with 
access to the internet at home had more than quadrupled, increasing from 16% of 
households in 1998 to 67% of households in 2007-08. 
■ The internet was by 2009 the most common way that Australians had last made 
contact with government.  In 2008, more than three in ten people had used the 
internet for the majority (all or most) of their contact with government, double the 
rate reported in 2004-05.  Since 2007, the internet had been the most preferred 
way to contact government.  While younger people were the most likely to use the 
internet to contact government (with persons aged 25 to 34 years having the 
highest rates of use), growth had been strongest in older age groups.  Since 2004-
05, rates had doubled for persons aged 55 to 64 years and had tripled for persons 
aged 65 years or over. 
■ The inquiry into the 2007 federal election by the JSCEM noted a ‘...growing 
reluctance on the part of electors to interact with the AEC using the paper-based 
and physical mail systems mandated by the Commonwealth Electoral Act...’, and 
methods aimed at modernising the means of communication between electors and 
the AEC featured prominently in the final report. 
■ Like most developed countries, Australia’s population was ageing due to sustained 
low fertility and increasing life expectancy.  Over the coming decades, population 
ageing in Australia was expected to have significant implications in areas such as 
health, labour force participation, housing and the demand for skilled labour. 
■ Based on information from the then most recent (2006-11) set of population 
projections produced by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), the population 
aged 18 years or over (i.e. of voting ages) was projected to increase from 16.1 
million persons at 30 June 2007 to between 17.4 and 17.6 million persons in 2012.  
                                               
33 Australian Electoral Commission (2009a). 
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■ Over the longer term, the age composition of the Australian population was 
projected to change considerably as a result of population ageing.  For example, 
over the next two decades, it was projected that persons aged 65 years or over will 
increase to around a quarter of the voting age population (from 17.2% of the 
population aged 18 years and over at 30 June 2007, to between 24.1 and 24.8% in 
2027).  
■ In 2006-07 there were 36,800 Australia-born residents (including Australia-born 
children whose parents were former settlers) who permanently departed Australia.  
This was double the number of Australia-born permanent departures in 1998-99 
(17,300).  
■ In both 1998-99 and 2006-07 the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United 
States of America were the top three destinations for Australia-born residents who 
departed Australia permanently.  These three destinations comprised 58% of all 
Australia-born permanent departures in 1998-99 compared with 52% in 2006-07. 
Population mobility, including overseas 
4.3 Australia now has a substantial expatriate population.  Measuring its size 
accurately is difficult, but the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, in 
its report entitled They still call Australia home: Inquiry into Australian expatriates, 
explored the issue in some detail, and cited (second hand) “evidence from the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) which estimated the number of Australian citizens 
living on a long-term or permanent basis in other countries as being 858,886 as at 31 
December 2001”, that being equivalent to 4.3% of the 2001 resident population.34  Since 
the number of permanent departures from Australia has shown a long term trend of 
increasing in absolute numbers year by year, it is highly likely that there has been an 
increase in the number of expatriates since 2001.35 
4.4 Within Australia, the population is also highly mobile.  Data from the 2011 census 
show that some 3.2 million people had changed their place of usual residence in the year 
preceding the census, while 7.9 million had made such a change in the five years 
preceding the census. 
4.5 Paradoxically, however, the ageing of the population is also giving rise to a cohort 
of potential voters who, while they may from time to time change residence, face greater 
                                               
34 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee (2005).  
35 In 2006, the Southern Cross Group, which among other things advocates for the voting rights of 
Australians overseas, estimated that approximately 700,000 adult Australian citizens lived 
overseas (Hill and Alport (2007)).  It needs to be emphasised, however, that figures on numbers of 
expatriate citizens do not necessarily correspond to the numbers of Australians overseas who are 
entitled to vote.  The Federal Parliament has made a conscious decision to provide only limited 
voting rights to long-term expatriates (Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2009b)),  As 
at 30 April 2013, there were only 15,833 eligible overseas electors registered for federal elections.  
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challenges in moving about or coping with life on a day-to-day basis.  It was noted in 
Australia’s Initial Report under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
that: 
“The 2003 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers 
(SDAC) showed that one in five people in Australia (3,958,300 or 20.0%) had a reported 
disability”,  
and that: 
“61% of the 3.8 million persons with disabilities living in households reported needing 
assistance to manage their health conditions or cope with the activities of everyday life.”. 
4.6 With the ageing of the population and the desire of many aged people to continue 
to live at home independently for as long as possible, there is an increasing number of 
people who tend to stay home and have services come to them.  This does not 
necessarily mean that they are not connected to the internet, although many of the older 
ones would not be. 
4.7 “Deinstitutionalisation” policies have seen increasing numbers of people with a 
disability being similarly situated.  
Changing nature of the printing industry and postal services 
4.8 Elections as currently conducted in Australasia are heavily dependent on a 
number of major service providers, including in particular the postal service and the 
printing industry. 
4.9 In Australia the manufacturing sector has declined somewhat in recent years: 
major explanatory factors include the global financial crisis, a stronger Australian dollar, 
and increased commodities prices which increased costs.  These trends are significant, 
but are not guaranteed to persist.  The domestic printing industry has faced financial 
challenges, resulting in several companies undergoing restructuring, management 
buyouts or mergers.  The capacity to print still exists, with under-utilisation of capacity 
often being a problem.  In the future, it is likely that financial difficulties will continue for the 
industry as demand for printed products eases.  However, in the timeframe covered by 
this paper and even a little beyond, it does not seem that the inability to print products for 
elections will exist.  An industry survey from March 2013 reported that printers were 
“pragmatic and even cautiously optimistic about the future”.36  Similar issues have existed 
for the paper industry. 
4.10 The future viability of the mail service in Australia might also be questioned, with 
reports in early 2013 that the United States Postal Service was ceasing Saturday mail 
                                               
36 Bendel (2013) 
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deliveries.37  This is a particular concern in the US since some jurisdictions only offer 
voting via the post.  In Australia at present, only a limited number of local government 
elections are conducted on a purely postal voting basis.38  The barrier presented by 
Australia Post’s outgoing mail capacity may be mitigated through the use of email voting, 
where the additional volume will be incoming mail not outgoing.  Additionally the equitable 
delivery of mail is a legislated obligation of Australia Post: the Australian Postal 
Corporation Act 1989 provides that Australia Post is to “ensure that the performance 
standards (including delivery times) for the letter service reasonably meet the social, 
industrial and commercial needs of the Australian community”.39  In some communities 
there is not a delivery service to home addresses but rather regular delivery to post office 
boxes or retail outlets.  The Auditor-General reports each financial year on Australia 
Post’s compliance with the prescribed performance standards; such reports are presented 
to the Parliament.40 A significant change to the delivery schedule on purely commercial 
considerations appears to be unlikely without oversight from the Parliament.  
The nature of campaigning 
4.11 The character of electoral campaigning in Australia has changed greatly in the last 
half century.  Fifty years ago, campaigning largely took place through public meetings, 
doorknocking, some radio, television and print advertising, and the publication of handbills 
and flyers, supplemented on polling day by the distribution of how-to-vote cards.  
Relatively few people voted before polling day, and an election blackout prevented 
electronic advertising in the days preceding the poll. 
4.12 While some of these techniques are still used by resource-poor small parties and 
independent candidates, the methods used by large parties have changed radically.  
Much more emphasis is now placed on broadcast advertising, internet advertising, the use 
of targeted direct mail, and “robo-calls”.  Parties also place great emphasis on making 
early contact with potential postal voters, especially through the distribution of postal vote 
application forms configured to be returned to the parties rather than lodged directly with 
the EMB.41  Finally, parties find themselves competing with far more “background noise” 
than was the case in bygone days, with voters being constantly bombarded with 
messages from the media, both traditional and social, most of which have little to do with 
politics. 
                                               
37 Moretti (2013). 
38 In WA, whilst 95 per cent of the State’s eligible electors live in local government districts that 
conduct postal vote only elections, the declining level of surface mail services by Australia Post in 
some regional areas has become a significant problem for the WAEC.  The VEC also reports that 
Australia Post will be unable to manage mail volume at the scale of the 2012 Local Government 
Elections in the future 
39 Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989, s. 27(4)(b). 
40 Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989, s. 28. 
41 In the ACT, however, this practice of the parties has been banned. 
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4.13 These changed approaches have implications for internet voting at a number of 
points. 
■ It would be technologically possible to make internet voting available from shortly 
after the close of nominations, as is currently done with postal voting.  At a federal 
referendum, internet voting could be opened from the issue of the writ, subject to 
the constitutional requirement that there be no voting in the two months following 
the passage by the Parliament of a proposed law for the alteration of the 
Constitution.  If, however, internet voting were to be made generally or widely 
available, there would be a real prospect that a significant proportion of the 
electorate would vote without the benefit of hearing what the parties and 
candidates had to say for themselves in the campaign.42  A value judgement 
needs to be made on whether society would regard that as a democratic advance. 
■ An alternative would be to limit internet voting to a few days before polling day, for 
example in the period currently covered by the election blackout.  That, however, 
would diminish to some extent the value sometimes asserted for internet voting 
that it provides voters with a more convenient service.  It would also have the 
potential to increase the load on systems, by increasing the number of people 
trying to vote in a given time period. 
■ It could reasonably be anticipated that parties which currently seek to interpose 
themselves between applicants for postal votes and the EMB might wish to 
become similarly placed in the process by which voters apply for internet votes; for 
example, to give themselves the capacity to capture voters’ email addresses or 
phone numbers so that the voters can be directly targeted by email or “robo-call” 
campaigning.  
■ Internet voting gives rise to the prospect that voters could access how-to-vote 
cards online, where a system for lodging and registering them existed.  It could be 
argued that this would put all candidates on a more equal footing, making them 
less dependent on being able to mobilise an army of supporters to canvass 
outside polling places. 
4.14 One striking aspect of modern campaigning is the proliferation of party and 
candidate posters at some polling places, occasionally taking the form of large rolls of 
printed plastic sheeting which can be used to cover almost completely the fence 
surrounding school grounds.  Smith (2013, p. 39) notes the reaction of some voters to the 
typical atmosphere at polling places, reported in a survey conducted for the New South 
Wales Electoral Commission after the 2011 State election, as follows: 
“A few, however, responded negatively to the politics of attending a polling place.  One 
respondent, for example, wrote: ‘It [the iVote] is more private, you can take your time 
                                               
42 This issue, of course, also arises in relation to postal voting. 
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selecting the person you are voting for and you are not intimidated by other people around 
you or hassled by supporters of the parties’.”. 
The rise of the internet 
4.15 The internet had its origins in the 1960s and recently the World Wide Web (which, 
along with email, is the medium through which most people interact with the internet) 
celebrated its 20th birthday.  Throughout the 1990s a desktop computer or bulky laptop 
had to be physically connected by phone line, via a dial-up connection, to utilise these 
services.  This only provided slow connections, and had the disadvantage of occupying 
the phone line while the internet was being accessed.  During the 1990s the number of 
people with an internet connection at home in Australia was still quite low (16% in 1998)43, 
and internet cafes were a popular way of accessing the internet. 
4.16 Within the home, the rate of internet connectivity increased significantly throughout 
the 2000s.  According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), in 2001 35% of homes 
had access to the internet and in 2008-9 this had grown to 72%.44  The devices which 
people used to access the internet changed during this growth.  Laptops become smaller, 
lighter and cheaper, and the sales of those devices eventually overtook desktop 
computers in 2008.45  It was also during the second half of this decade that WiFi as a 
mode of connecting within the home and in limited public areas increased in popularity.  
4.17 These changes occurred at the same time as a significant increase in access 
speeds, where dial-up connections were abandoned in favour of technologies which 
offered faster speeds.  The new ADSL technology, which still used the same copper 
phone network but which could operate at the same time as a regular phone call, was first 
offered by Telstra in 2000.  Further jumps in speeds occurred through the decade with the 
introduction of ADSL2 and ADSL2+.  According to the ABS, in June 2006 and December 
2012 the ways which people connected to the internet were as follows.46 
                                               
43 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011). 
44 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2007); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011). 
45 Sydney Morning Herald (2008). 
46 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012).  Actual figures represented by the 2006 bar chart are: 
mobile – 1.6%, Cable – 10.9%, DSL – 40.4%, Dial-up – 46.8%.  Actual figures represented by the 
2012 bar chart are: mobile – 49.7%, cable – 8.4%, DSL – 38.9, Dial-up – 2.3%. 
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4.18 Almost half of internet connections in December 2012 were mobile and fixed 
wireless.  At the end of 2012, there were 6 million wireless broadband connections in 
Australia.47  The connection which was growing fastest in the second half of 2012 was 
fibre, which grew by 75%.  These figures suggest two trends - the ability to access the 
                                               
47 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012). 
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internet via a form of mobile connectivity is very popular, and the market is demanding 
faster internet access, as evinced by the increase in fibre connections.48  
4.19 US research may provide some insights into likely patterns of internet use by the 
young.  The Pew Research Center in the United States recently released a study 
examining teenagers and technology.49  Since 2006, the rate of teenagers who are online 
has remained consistent at 95%, but what has changed is the form of device and 
connection used.50  The study revealed that the accessing of the internet via mobile 
devices is commonplace.  The group surveyed was between 12 and 17 years of age.  
Almost half of those surveyed owned a smart phone, a quarter said that they mostly 
accessed the internet from their phone, and nearly three-quarters use a phone, tablet or 
other mobile device to access the internet at least occasionally.51  The survey did find that 
those from lower socio-economic groups were still somewhat less likely to use the internet 
in any capacity, but that those who did have internet were at least as likely to use a mobile 
device as their main point of access.52  
4.20 The trend would appear not to be restricted to those below the voting age.  A 
report by Cisco from February 2013 claimed that from 2011 to 2012, global mobile data 
traffic had grown by 70%, and within Australia it had grown 40% from mid-2011 to mid-
2012.53 To provide some context for the volume of data under discussion, the global 
mobile traffic alone was nearly twelve times the size of the entire global internet data of 
2000.54 
4.21 Nowadays, internet cafes, although still in existence, are becoming rarities as it 
becomes cheaper and easier to access the internet from smart phones.  This allows 
people to access the internet from wherever there is a mobile broadband signal.  As of 
September 2012, the British communications regulator, Ofcom, claimed that 56% of 
Australians owned a smart phone.55  The Australian Communications and Media Authority 
(ACMA) stated that as of May 2012, the percentage of smartphone owning adults in 
Australia was at 49%.56  Another change is also happening with internet access within 
homes.  According to Ofcom, Australia shares with Spain the highest take up rate of tablet 
devices in the world, at 24%.57  Meanwhile, the ACMA reported that 29% of households 
                                               
48 Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012). 
49 Madden et al (2013). 
50 Madden et al (2013, p. 3). 
51 Madden et al (2013, p. 2). 
52 Madden et al (2013, p. 2). 
53 Cisco (2013, p. 4). 
54 Cisco (2013, p. 1). 
55 Ofcom (2012, p. 6). 
56 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2013, p. 6). 
57 Ofcom (2012, p. 4). 
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accessed the internet with a tablet.  It is suggested by the ACMA that due to the current 
pricing scheme for mobile broadband connectivity and the widespread availability of WiFi 
hotspots in public areas (such as cafes and shopping centres) and within the home, 
tablets are typically connected to the internet via the fixed-line networks.58 
4.22 Throughout the 1990s, the standard way of accessing the internet was via a large 
desktop computer at home, work, school, internet cafe or library.  This has been 
transformed to a situation in which all of the above are still possible, but additionally 
people can access it from wherever there is a mobile broadband signal, which can even 
be found in developing countries.  The devices used encompass smartphones, tablets, 
laptop, desktop computers, televisions and gaming consoles.  Further complicating the 
picture is the blurring of categories between smartphones and tablets (phablets), and 
between tablets and laptops where the devices take the form of a laptop but have the 
ability to split in half and operate as a tablet.  
Increased commercially-available internet voting for private and fee-
for-service (FFS) elections and other ballots   
4.23 There has been growing use of internet and intranet voting in the commercial 
environment, in particular in Certified Agreement ballots where a simple Yes/No is 
required, and in elections for company directors.   Certainly intranet voting and simple 
internal email polling has been available since the late 1990s when intranet and company 
email became standard in most large businesses and government departments.  
4.24 The ACT Electoral Commission recently commissioned and released “Yes/No” 
internet voting software to address the rising demand for this type of commercial service.   
The AEC has also recently released a Request for Tender for similar software.   Other 
EMBs have expressed an interest in having access to software to assist in the conduct of 
commercial elections of this type via the internet.  This is an area in which there is also 
substantial private sector interest. 
4.25 In the realm of social media, internet and phone polling techniques are being used 
in an increasingly profitable manner to “vote” for talent (Australian Idol) or to “vote” people 
out of competitions (Big Brother).  The use of this social type of voting may condition the 
public into believing that voting is easy, secure and believable, even though these social 
experiences encourage voters to vote more than once and the voter pays for the privilege. 
                                               
58 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2013, p. 16). 
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Public attitudes to, and trust in, internet voting, the election process 
and EMBs 
4.26 The greatest intangible asset possessed by any EMB is public trust, since that 
goes to the heart of public acknowledgement of the legitimacy of electoral processes.  As 
noted at paragraphs 3.39 to 3.44 above, public attitudes to internet voting have been 
explored to some extent, but not extensively canvassed, in Australia.     
4.27 Public reaction to the NSWEC’s iVote system has been very positive: of the 
surveyed users, 96% were satisfied with how iVote worked.59  The current environment in 
NSW appears to be very receptive to using the internet to vote.  This is likely to have been 
influenced by their past experiences with EMBs, their exposure to the internet in general, 
and the iVote process. 
4.28 Trust has been highlighted as a significant issue for internet voting in a number of 
studies.60  This flows in the main from the fact that electronic transactions cannot be 
directly monitored in the same way as manual handling of ballot papers.  Trust in election 
processes will typically be a cultural phenomenon which has developed over a long 
period, and may spring from many different sources, including some of the following. 
■ The general attitude to public institutions in a country may be a trusting one, and 
the EMB may simply benefit from this generally benevolent atmosphere.  This is 
largely the case in Australia. 
■ EMBs which have a long history and have earned public respect will potentially 
enjoy levels of trust even higher than some other comparable public officials, 
especially if their independence from the government of the day enjoys 
constitutional or statutory protection, and if they have built a reputation for honesty 
and transparency. 
■ Voters tend to trust election results because, in Australia, surprise results are 
comparatively rare.  Voters may have an intuitive sense of community attitudes 
towards various parties and candidates at any particular time, and these are 
reinforced by public opinion polls which, in Australia, have had a reasonably good 
record of anticipating election results in recent years. 
■ Another factor which may well have contributed to people’s trust in Australian 
EMBs is the extensive participation of ordinary people in the electoral process.  
The AEC hires nearly 70,000 people for a federal election; this means many 
Australians have a friend, neighbour or relative who works on election day.  
Ordinary people also have the ability to participate by assisting candidates in 
handing out how-to-vote cards at polling places, and by acting as scrutineers.  
                                               
59 Allen Consulting Group (2011, p. 33).  
60 See, for example, Barrat i Esteve, Goldsmith and Turner (2012, pp. 23-38). 
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These activities provide the opportunity for everyday citizens to participate actively 
in the electoral process, and to become broadly comfortable with it. 
■ In general, Australia’s manual electoral processes are relatively simple and 
transparent, making them readily susceptible to scrutiny.  Even the more complex 
processes are typically capable of being decomposed into smaller elements on 
which individual scrutineers can focus. 
■ Scrutineers also enjoy extensive statutory rights, of which they are well aware, and 
generally do not hesitate to assert those rights when the need arises. 
■ Changes to Australian electoral processes have tended to be incremental rather 
than radical, such that a sense of public familiarity with their broad outline is 
sustained from election to election.  Ritualistic elements of elections, such as 
attendance voting and the use of the National Tally Room may well contribute to 
this.61 
4.29 The diversity of these sources of trust highlights the complexity of the factors 
which could potentially influence public attitudes to internet voting (which remain, to a 
significant extent, a matter for speculation).  As the use of the internet becomes more and 
more integrated into the fabric of daily life, it is possible that voters might come to be 
increasingly comfortable with its use in the electoral context, and might, moreover, be 
prepared to treat any problems arising in internet voting systems with a degree of 
pragmatic tolerance. 
Attitudes to risk 
4.30 The preceding analysis has examined in some detail the different factors which 
contribute to high levels of community trust in Australia’s electoral processes.  Assessing 
the willingness of the community to accept and manage electoral processes involving risk 
is more difficult, for a number of reasons. 
4.31 First, it is in the nature of EMBs to be, rationally, very risk-averse.  An election is 
the biggest peacetime logistical operation which a country faces, and an EMB has one 
chance every few years to get it right.  EMBs tend to have a strong sense of the 
                                               
61 The Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2007) touched on considerations of this 
type, when unanimously recommending the retention by the AEC of the National Tally Room 
(NTR): 
 
“The committee supports the continuation of the NTR given its historical place in Australian politics 
and elections.  Australia is one of the world’s longest running democracies, and needs to value its 
history and traditions. … Furthermore, the committee notes, there is a value - and logic - in having a 
central tally room in the national capital for the federal election.  This value extends far beyond dollar 
or logistical considerations.  There is a view that, by providing a focal point for the display of results 
on election night, the NTR actually promotes a visible symbolism of transparency in the election 
process. …  The committee is of the view that the abolition of the NTR would have a negative impact 
on the perception of the transparency of elections.”. 
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reputational risks which could flow from a serious failure at election time, and sad 
experience in many countries has shown that trust typically takes a long time to build up, 
but can be lost quickly.  Most Parliaments and EMBs therefore want to minimise risk, and 
design processes accordingly.  Major public failures are therefore rare, providing little 
evidential basis for inferences to be drawn concerning the willingness of the community to 
accept particular levels of risk.  
4.32 There have, however, been some cases, either repetitive or one-off, which can 
provide some insights in this regard.   
■ The diversity of Australia’s voting channels in fact makes it possible for some 
people to vote more than once, and a reasonable estimate of the number who in 
fact do so (usually as a result of confusion associated with advanced age) can 
normally be made.  The numbers in question are made public, and have not led to 
any widespread community outcry: the risks in question are seen as manageable, 
not least because the average number of such votes per division is comparatively 
small. 
■ There are, occasionally, major failings in ballot handling; the disenfranchisement of 
voters in the division of Boothby at the 2010 federal election is a case in point.  
Notwithstanding the involvement of a significant number of ballots, the perceived 
legitimacy of the election was not seriously compromised, and the outcome of the 
election was not challenged in court.  The event appears to have been seen as a 
random failing, rather than one evincing major systemic shortcomings. 
4.33 That having been said, an EMB, unlike a private company, cannot simply decide to 
pitch at a chosen sector of the market: it has equal obligations to all citizens.  Risk 
management cannot be done in a way which is discriminatory, or which seeks to treat 
threats to the integrity of some individuals’ votes as in some sense statistically negligible. 
Diversity of electoral processes in a federal system 
4.34 The nature of Australia’s electoral arrangements is very much influenced by the 
existence of nine substantially sovereign jurisdictions, each with its own EMB.  This has 
created many opportunities for innovation, the flip side of which may be the adoption of 
diverse approaches to the solution of similar problems.  In the short run this makes it 
unlikely that any one approach to an issue as complex as internet voting will become 
dominant. 
4.35 Appendix B provides a brief summary of the current state of legislation which 
might govern or impinge upon the use of internet voting.  At present, only New South 
Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory have laws in place which in the view 
of their EMBs make some form of internet voting possible.  Appendix C sets out current 
positions of ECANZ members in relation to internet voting. 
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5. Rights and obligations 
5.1 This Part documents and analyses relevant high-level principles which should be 
taken into account when making decisions on the appropriate place for internet voting. 
5.2 Implicit in the concept of identifying a possible place for internet voting in a 
jurisdiction’s electoral system is the notion that such an innovation should, in some sense, 
make  the system more accessible to a diversified group.  This directly implies a need to 
elaborate fundamental principles which can be used as points of reference to determine 
what constitutes a legitimate election, or an improvement over the status quo.  The 
intention here is therefore to identify some of the more widely-accepted general principles 
relating to rights and obligations which are most relevant to the issue of internet voting, 
while noting that in practice some principles may be in conflict with each other, at least to 
some extent.62  The implications which some of these principles may have for internet 
voting are further addressed in Part 7.  In the first instance, however, the sources of 
principles need to be identified.63   
Constitutional law 
5.3 The first such source is constitutional law.  While Australia has a written 
constitution, as do all of its States, those documents’ provisions governing the conduct of 
elections and methods of balloting are relatively sparse.  Sections 8 and 30 of the 
Australian Constitution express one important principle applicable at federal elections, a 
requirement that in the choosing of members or of senators, “each elector shall vote only 
once”. 
Instruments and documents elaborating principles relevant to internet 
voting 
5.4 Appendix D sets out extracts from a range of different declarations, covenants 
and other documents which state principles deemed relevant to the conduct of free, fair 
and credible elections.  While they have not in general been incorporated in Australian 
domestic law, a number of them represent express morally binding commitments which 
Australia has made.64  It should be noted that no international instrument purports to 
                                               
62 Quite apart from the question of whether particular models of internet voting might be acceptable 
in principle, there will always be a host of practical questions - for example, costs and benefits - to 
be considered.  Some of these are touched upon on Part 7 below. 
63 This issue is addressed in some detail in the second chapter of the Electoral Reform Green 
Paper - Strengthening Australia’s Democracy (Australian Government (2009, pp. 18-22)). 
64 In that context, it should be noted that Australia was one of eight nations involved in the drafting 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1948; Australia is a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966; 
and Australia has signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  In 
addition, the 1994 Inter-Parliamentary Union Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections 
was supported by the Australian delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Council meeting at which it 
was adopted. 
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elaborate a specific right to vote on the part of citizens of a country who are part of an 
overseas diaspora. 
5.5 Four of the policy matters addressed in the texts set out in Appendix D are 
particularly relevant to internet voting: 
■ the absolute right to a secret ballot and the uniform priority given to it, and fact 
that the secret ballot has the character of an obligation placed on the state; 
■ the need for any balloting process to guarantee the free expression of the will of 
the electors, without fear or intimidation;   
■ The need, explicitly stated in the Inter-Parliamentary Union Declaration on Criteria 
for Free and Fair Elections,65 for States to “take all necessary and appropriate 
measures to ensure the transparency of the entire electoral process 
including, for example through the presence of party agents and duly accredited 
observers”; and 
■ The need to ensure universal and non-discriminatory access to the right to 
vote, with particular reference to persons with disabilities. 
5.6 In the Australian context, the first two of these have long been seen as inextricably 
linked, and are considered together below. 
The secret ballot, and free expression of the electors’ will, without fear 
or intimidation 
5.7 A secret ballot is typically argued to provide a necessary, though not always 
sufficient, safeguard against fear and  intimidation, since, properly administered, it makes 
it almost impossible for an intimidator to determine whether his or her wishes have been 
followed or ignored by the voter.66  It is also argued to reduce the efficacy of attempts at 
bribery or vote-buying, by making it difficult for the buyer to confirm that the vote has been 
cast as he or she wished.67 
                                               
65 Inter-Parliamentary Union (1994).  See Appendix D, paragraphs D5 and D6. 
66 In some post-conflict polls in other countries, it has been thought desirable not only to ensure the 
secrecy of the vote of each individual, but also to disguise voting patterns of particular villages or 
communities.  This is typically achieved by mixing ballot papers from different sources at a central 
counting station before they are sorted according to the votes they bear.  Such processes were 
used, for example, at the Cambodian election of 1993, and the “popular consultation” ballot of 1999 
which led to the independence of East Timor.  In both cases, there had been concerns that voters 
could be intimidated by threats of collective rather than individual retribution. 
67 A secret ballot is usually seen as a necessary, though not always sufficient, mechanism for 
discouraging bribery and vote buying.  Also of considerable significance is the configuration of 
processes to ensure that a voter who has cast a vote privately cannot prove to a corruptor that the 
latter’s wishes have been followed.  Examples of such mechanisms include a ban on taking 
photographs in, or cameras into, polling places; and the provision typically found in electoral laws 
that a vote cast on a paper ballot will be informal if it bears writing or marks identifying the voter.  In 
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5.8 The concept of the secret ballot is frequently referenced but less often clearly 
defined.  As noted at Appendix D, paragraph D10, the Federal Court of Australia, in the 
leading case of  Re William Joseph Yarran v Michael Blurton and others [1992] FCA 
199,68 has observed among other things that: 
“Physical isolation of the voter and a system for separating or keeping separate the voter's 
identity and the record of the vote cast are essential elements of the modern understanding 
of the secret ballot.”. 
5.9 The archetypical mechanism for ensuring secrecy is the classic “Australian ballot”: 
the conduct of polling at polling places organised by the EMB, at which ballot papers 
prepared by the EMB are issued to eligible voters, marked by them in private voting 
compartments, and immediately deposited in a ballot box.  Under such arrangements, the 
EMB takes responsibility for ensuring that the voter is able to vote privately, and the voter 
is (or at any rate is supposed to be) prevented from showing his or her ballot paper to 
anyone who might be minded to pay for a vote to be cast for a particular party or 
candidate. 
5.10 As noted at paragraph 3.4 above, alternative arrangements are, however, often 
put in place to cater for voters who are unable to attend a polling place; and in Australia 
such exceptional arrangements have included provision for voting in close proximity to a 
polling place; postal voting away from polling places; the provision of assistance to blind, 
disabled or print handicapped voters when marking their ballots; voting overseas by 
military forces in time of war; and the conduct of Antarctic voting in circumstances in which 
the secrecy of the vote cannot be guaranteed.  Such schemes are typically characterised 
either as consistent with the objective of a secret ballot, or as representing a legitimate 
derogation from it in circumstances where the only alternative would be the outright 
disenfranchisement of the affected voters. 
5.11 Paradoxically, internet voting has been argued to be capable of both enhancing 
and derogating from the secrecy of the ballot. 
■ As noted in Part 3 above, it has been clearly demonstrated in practice that 
appropriately designed electronic interfaces can make it possible for persons who 
otherwise would be dependent on assistance to mark a paper ballot to vote without 
assistance, thereby enhancing in that respect the secrecy of their votes.  A facility 
of this type can be provided via the internet using kiosk voting, mobile internet 
                                                                                                                                              
polities where attempts at vote buying are rife, ingenious mechanisms, such as the so-called 
“Tasmanian Dodge” (Fredman (1968, p. 10)), have sometimes been used by voters and their co-
conspirators to prove that votes have been cast in accordance with payments made.  
68 Federal Court of Australia (1992). 
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voting or remote internet voting; or through an electronic voting process not 
involving the internet, such as that used in the ACT. 
■ It has, however, also been argued that security weaknesses in the internet could 
enable the way in which a person votes (or has attempted to vote) over the 
internet to be discovered. 
■ Email voting and remote internet voting are also said to have the potential to 
compromise secrecy because, unlike voting at a polling place, they take place in 
an unsupervised environment, giving rise to the possibility that someone can be 
present, with or without the voter’s consent, and can see for whom the vote has 
been cast. 
5.12 Regarding the first of these points: as detailed in Part 3 above, the need to provide 
an opportunity for BLV voters to cast their votes without being dependent on assistance 
has been a significant driver for the introduction of electronic voting mechanisms in 
Australia.  Studies of the use of such mechanisms at the 2007 federal election, the 2011 
NSW election, and a series of ACT elections have confirmed their efficacy. 
5.13 Regarding the second point, as noted at paragraph 1.9 above, it has been deemed 
beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the arguments which have been raised 
regarding internet security, but the issue is one which any community considering the 
introduction of internet voting needs to address. 
5.14 Underlying the third point are two different views of the character and objectives of 
a secret ballot.69 
The secret ballot as a matter of shared community interest 
5.15 The first view is that “secret balloting” is not just a right given to individual voters 
which can be taken up or set aside by them at will, but a characteristic of the overall 
election process in which all voters have a shared interest.  Jones and Simons (2012, p. 
350) express this view as follows: 
“The secret ballot was instituted to protect against voter intimidation; as such, each voter 
has a right to the assurance that other voters have not been intimidated into disclosing 
their ballots or into voting a particular way.”. 
Such a view of the process could reasonably be inferred from the laws currently governing 
legislative elections in Australia and New Zealand, which in general prescribe that votes, 
whether cast at a polling place or remotely, must be marked secretly; this being expressed 
through the specification of procedures which the voter is, on the face of it, legally obliged 
to follow.  
                                               
69 For a more detailed discussion of these two views, see Barrat i Esteve, Goldsmith and Turner 
(2012, pp. 44-48). 
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5.16 More generally, the history of the introduction of the “Australian ballot”, both in 
Australia and around the world, points to that having been motivated not just by a desire 
to better protect individual rights, but also by the need to effect systemic improvements in 
electoral processes and politics.70 
5.17 An analogy might be drawn with the process of vaccination: while that is primarily 
designed as a way of protecting the health of individuals, it also has an important societal, 
public health dimension, in that comprehensive vaccination holds out the hope that fell 
diseases may be eliminated from a community. 
5.18 The policy implications of the adoption of this view are that: 
■ voters should in general be required to vote in conditions of state-guaranteed 
secrecy (i.e., at polling places, or in circumstances where there are officials 
present), with derogations from that only permitted when the alternative would be 
to disenfranchise the voter, or to force him or her to incur substantial costs or 
inconvenience; and 
■ even where secrecy is not state-guaranteed, there will be a legal responsibility 
placed on the voter to vote secretly.   
The secret ballot as a right which individuals should have the opportunity to 
exercise 
5.19 An alternative view of “secret balloting” is that its essence is that all voters have 
the opportunity to vote in secret.  In association with this, however, some or all voters 
may be offered alternative unsupervised remote voting channels, such as postal voting or 
remote internet voting, under which secrecy cannot be state-guaranteed (either to the 
voter, or to other voters or stakeholders who may believe they have an interest in the 
process surrounding (as distinct from the content of) other electors’ votes).   
5.20 It is important to emphasise that an opportunity to vote secretly must be a genuine 
one given the circumstances of individual voters, rather than one that exists only on 
paper.  In that context, it should be borne in mind that a voter who has concerns about 
voting in an unsupervised channel may also feel compromised in his or her ability to make 
an overt choice to use a supervised voting channel, such as a polling place. 
5.21 The policy implications of the adoption of this view are that: 
■ it can legitimately be left to the voter to choose the voting channel which best fits 
his or her needs; 
■ the casting of a vote in conditions of “state-supplied” secrecy is something which 
an individual voter may “trade off” in order to make use of a mechanism which is, 
                                               
70 McKenna (2001); Fredman (1968). 
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for him or her, more convenient, even if that is not strictly necessary to ensure that 
he or she can vote without substantial personal cost or inconvenience; and 
■ such “trade offs” fall within the private sphere of each individual voter. 
Free expression of the electors’ will, without fear or intimidation 
5.22 The Macquarie Dictionary (4th ed.) primarily defines “fear” as “a painful feeling of 
impending danger, evil, trouble, etc”.  To “intimidate” is: 
“1. to make timid, or inspire with fear; overawe; cow. 2. To force into or deter from some 
action by inducing fear: to intimidate a voter”. 
Intimidation is therefore an action, which implies the objective existence of an intimidator.  
Fear, on the other hand, is a feeling or sense, subjectively experienced, which may or 
may not have a rational basis. 
5.23 The factors which contribute to potential levels of fear and/or intimidation in a 
society are complex, and can vary greatly from country to country, and over time.71  
Individual fear, and intimidation directed towards an individual, may be a product of an 
individual’s circumstances and relationships, but is likely to be greatly influenced by the 
overall situation and atmosphere in a country.  In post-conflict countries, intimidation may 
at times have been almost a way of life, fear can be pervasive, and people may see 
political campaigns as likely to re-open old wounds and may have experienced elections 
as flash points leading to violence and destruction.  If people sense that an incumbent 
government will refuse to accept defeat at an election, and therefore fear to vote it out, 
they are, in effect, victims of collective intimidation aimed at the entire electorate.72 
5.24 Established democracies, on the other hand, tend to be characterised by relatively 
high degrees of political tolerance and civility; acceptance of the importance of respect for 
democratic processes; and a widespread public censure of intimidatory tactics by political 
players.  Social disincentives to misbehaviour are strong, and effective.73   
                                               
71 Birch (2011, p. 48) notes that according to the “Index of Electoral Malpractice” expounded in her 
study, “voter intimidation and/or obstruction” is strikingly more manifest in the former Soviet Union 
and in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
72 For a discussion of this in the Cambodian context, see Sanderson and Maley (1998, p. 247). 
73 Smith (2013, p. 4) discusses this issue in the Australian context, and emphasises that: 
“Australia currently has a number of strong non-technical safeguards against voter interference.  
These include public avenues for complaints by electoral stakeholders, an independent electoral 
administration, low general levels of corruption, relatively high living standards, an egalitarian 
individualist culture, and a strong civil society.”. 
He concludes (at p. 43) that:  
“The argument and evidence presented in this report point to an extremely low presence and risk of 
voter coercion or bribery in contemporary Australia.  Isolated small pockets of expressive coercion 
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5.25 The polling place - established, managed and secured by the EMB - provides the 
archetypical mechanism for ensuring that voters need not, at least when casting their 
ballots, be fearful or intimidated.  That conception of its role may, however, be somewhat 
idealised. 
■ While voting in a secure environment may provide protection against individually 
directed intimidation, it will not by itself protect against pervasive fear of the type 
mentioned in paragraph 5.23 above.  (That having been said, a large turnout at 
polling places in the face of fear, as was seen at the East Timor “popular 
consultation” in 1999, may constitute a powerful social statement in defiance of 
intimidation, as well as reinforcing individual feelings of bravery.) 
■ In a truly dangerous environment, it will not suffice to create a safe environment at 
polling places, since voters may be in danger when travelling from their homes to 
vote, or returning after voting. 
■ In addition, in the worst cases, attempts may be being made to intimidate voters 
into boycotting the polls, and the very act of going to the polling place may attract 
the intimidators’ wrath.  (In such a situation, the ability to choose an alternative 
voting channel could actually assist voters, though the ability of a country facing 
such problems to be able to establish credible, high integrity alternative voting 
channels would have to be a matter of doubt.) 
■ If, on the other hand, the social environment in a country is benign, and 
intimidation for political purposes is almost unthinkable, the environment at the 
polling place will have little contribution to make to people’s sense of safety.  (In 
that context, it may be noted that formal “security” is almost never required at 
polling places in Australia, in contrast to the situation applying in many parts of the 
world.) 
5.26 All of that having been said, however, two further points needs to be emphasised. 
■ The obligation placed on the state, and on EMBs, is to seek to ensure to the 
greatest extent possible that all voters are able to vote without fear or intimidation.  
“Expressive coercion”74 may in some cases affect a relatively small number of 
                                                                                                                                              
may currently occur in families, religious groups and the like; however, these are so small as to 
register only as vague suggestions in public discussion.”. 
74 Smith (2013, p. 17) describes this phenomenon as follows: 
 
“Instead of aiming to achieve a particular electoral outcome, the perpetrator aims to ensure that 
members of their group affirm the identity or values of that group through their actions.  Examples of 
such groups would include families, rural estates, villages, trade unions, companies and sects.  The 
affirmation of group identity by voting in a particular way (or by not voting) reinforces existing power 
structures within the group.  From the point of view of powerful figures in the group (fathers, religious 
leaders, etc.), it is best if compliance is based on an acceptance of their legitimate authority.  Where 
this fails, coercion can be used to ensure compliance and maintain the group’s sense of itself.  
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voters, and therefore be unlikely to impact on an election result; but from the point 
of view of each individual voter so expressively coerced, his or her free exercise of 
the franchise may have been 100% compromised, and this must be a matter of 
concern to EMBs, and to the state. 
■ Expressive coercion may be extremely subtle in character.  On this, Birch and 
Watt (2004, p. 66) note that: 
“The dominant currency of the home is typically that of emotion, rather than that of 
money or brute force.  Within the emotional economy of the home, psychological 
pressure may well have the same if not greater power to alter behaviour as that of 
money or force in the public arena.  So, though more subtle and difficult to identify, 
emotional coercion may pose just as serious a threat to democracy - indeed, these 
very qualities may make it even more worrisome.  The common distinction 
between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres breaks down when we consider the 
complex overlapping spheres of ‘privacy’ within the home.  Acts that are ‘private’ 
within the family may not be sufficiently private for individual family members.”.  
■ Voting at polling places may in its own subtle way help to counteract this, not by 
providing any physical protection, but by taking the voter into a different 
environment from the home, where the atmosphere emphasises individual 
autonomy, the exercise of personal rights, and participation in a structured public 
act of choice.75 
Transparency 
5.27 The concept of transparency (as implicitly elaborated in paragraph 5.5 above) can 
be viewed in two different ways.76  
                                                                                                                                              
Bribery is rarely if ever used to secure expressive votes, since the groups involved tend to be close-
knit and hierarchical.”. 
75 This point is elaborated by Birch (2003), as follows; 
 
“We have a right to family life, but we also have rights within family life - the right to be free from 
physical coercion, for example.  If we introduce into this complex equation civic rights, the situation 
gets more complicated still.  We then have a civic right - and a civic duty - that must be protected in 
the context of the home.  But this is difficult.  In the domestic context, civic duty could well give way to 
immediate personal duty, civic norms of equality could give way to cultural domestic norms of 
dependence, honour and obedience.  This is where the distinction between the public and the private 
breaks down, where the voter is caught uncomfortably between competing value systems.  A person 
should be able to be both a good citizen and a good family member without having to sacrifice one of 
these roles.  Yet that is what the seemingly innocuous move of bringing voting into the home has the 
power to do: it may place voters in the difficult position of having to make choices between 
performing their family duties or their civic duty.  It is all too plain that family duties will in most cases 
win the day; many voters will simply not be able to afford to jeopardise their domestic harmony and 
financial security for the sake of preserving the integrity of their miniscule contribution to the electoral 
process.”. 
 
76 For a discussion of this and other issues associated with transparency, see Barrat i Esteve, 
Goldsmith and Turner (2012, pp. 27-32). 
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■ From one perspective, it can be seen as a set of instrumental arrangements 
intended to achieve an even more fundamental objective, that the body politic will 
trust and accept election results as reflecting a legitimate expression of the 
societal will. 
■ Transparency may also, however, be seen as a right in itself, the argument being 
that political parties and, more generally, the people (whose will is declared by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to be “the basis of the authority of 
government”) are inherently entitled to know about, understand, and judge the 
propriety of, the way in which elections are conducted. 
5.28 The second of these points is fundamentally a philosophical position, albeit one 
which would be widely regarded as reasonable and even obvious.  The first, however, can 
be considered from an empirical point of view: to what extent do transparency 
mechanisms in fact enhance trust and the acceptance of election results?  As discussed 
at paragraphs 4.28 and 4.29 above, transparency is but one of a number of factors which 
contribute to trust.  That having been said, it is possible (though by no means certain) that 
transparency may in a particular society be an essential component of trust, in that the 
use of intrinsically non-transparent election processes could potentially lead to a decline in 
trust, if not immediately, then in the long run. 
5.29 The IPU Declaration pointedly emphasises the need for the transparency of the 
“entire” electoral process.  In relation to internet voting, this is potentially challenging in 
two distinct ways. 
■ When voting take place at polling places, the process can readily be observed by 
scrutineers.  Email voting and remote internet voting take place in venues chosen 
by the voter, and traditional scrutineering is impossible.  (The same is true of 
postal voting, but not of kiosk voting and mobile internet voting.) 
■ When polling and counting involve manual processes which take place at polling 
places, counting centres etc., the entire process is visible to the naked eye.  
However, as highlighted at paragraph 2.6 above, when the internet becomes 
involved, much of the process takes place, metaphorically speaking, in 
“cyberspace”, and different scrutineering mechanisms and techniques, based on 
different and more specialised and sophisticated skills, are required. 
5.30 A further issue which arises when considering the principle of transparency is what 
information an EMB needs to give voters to enable them to make informed decisions 
regarding voting modalities: it would, at the minimum, seem reasonable to expect and 
insist that any voter who chooses to use an alternative voting channel rather than 
attending a polling place be put in a position of giving informed consent to any attendant 
risks to the secrecy and security of his or her ballot.  In this spirit, it is currently made clear 
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to potential users of Antarctic voting at the federal level, and the Express Voting 
mechanism provided by the TEC for State elections, that the secrecy of their votes cannot 
be guaranteed.  It would arguably be necessary for voters to be clearly informed about 
unresolved or “risk-managed” issues of internet security (of the type mentioned at 
paragraph 5.11 above) which create vulnerabilities which could compromise the secrecy 
or accurate recording of their votes. 
Universal and non-discriminatory access 
5.31 This principle, in contrast to some of those discussed above, is relatively 
straightforward in its application: all voters should be able to cast a secret ballot, and 
should be able to do so without incurring significant personal costs. 
5.32 In general, the provision of a range of different voting channels, appropriately 
configured to the needs of a range of different classes of voters, will enable this 
requirement to be better satisfied.  This, however, will not always be the case if the 
ultimate objective is not to increase the number of channels, but to replace some with 
others.  If, for example, postal voting is supplemented by remote internet voting, the rights 
of those who need to vote remotely but are beyond the range of a postal service may be 
better served, without disadvantaging anyone who wishes to vote by post.  If, however, 
postal voting is replaced by remote internet voting, those uncomfortable with the use of 
technology, or who do not trust the internet, will see themselves as disadvantaged.   
Conflicts between principles 
5.33 Finally, the point needs to be made that some of these principles may in practice 
turn out to be in conflict with each other.  For example, remote internet voting may 
enhance the universality of voting, and enable secret ballots to be cast by persons who 
otherwise could only vote with assistance; but this may come at a cost of reduced or 
changed transparency of the process from the point of view of parties and candidates. 
5.34 When such contradictions arise, a decision will need to be made on which principle 
should in the circumstances be given priority; and given the fundamental character of the 
principles in question, it is arguable that such decisions are ones which should be made 
by the community and its representatives, rather than by EMBs.   
6. Potential motivations for the introduction of internet 
voting  
6.1 This Part identifies potential benefits and likely beneficiaries from the use of 
internet voting. 
6.2 Drivers for the introduction of internet voting fall into three main categories: 
 Page 56    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
■ provision of better service to individual voters or categories of voters; 
■ enhancements to the overall electoral process; and 
■ realisation of efficiencies in the administration of elections. 
6.3 These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive: if, for example, internet 
voting facilitates participation by people who would otherwise have been disenfranchised, 
they benefit directly, turnout will be increased in a way which would be seen as enhancing 
(at least to some extent) the legitimacy of the outcome; and the EMB will save money on 
non-voter follow up.  They nevertheless provide a useful framework for thinking about the 
issues. 
6.4 It needs to be emphasised that at this level of analysis, the specific model of 
internet voting chosen becomes significant: some will be more relevant than others to the 
achievement of specific objectives. 
Provision of better service to individual voters 
6.5 A major argument for internet voting is that it will facilitate voting by persons who 
otherwise would face challenges in participation.  We can seek to exemplify categories of 
such voters, ranked by need, as follows. 
Category of voters Comments 
1. Those who cannot vote except on the 
internet - There may be some voters for whom internet 
voting is the only possible way of voting.  These may 
be people who cannot attend a polling place, pre-poll 
voting venue or mobile polling point, who live beyond 
the range of postal systems, who can only 
communicate or transact with the outside world through 
the internet, and who could not use some other voting 
modality, such as telephone or call centre voting. 
 
The needs of these voters could only be met by 
email voting or remote internet voting, and their 
capacity to use email voting would be dependent on 
access to a scanner, which would be problematical 
in most cases. 
2. Those who cannot otherwise cast a 
personal and secret vote - There will be voters who 
could use a voting channel other than the internet, but 
who by doing so would compromise the personal and 
secret character of their votes.  Blind and low vision 
voters, deaf and blind voters, some print handicapped 
voters, and some disabled voters could fall into this 
category, as could Antarctic voters. 
 
It is the electronic character of the act of voting, 
rather than the use of the internet per se, which 
benefits voters in this category: they would 
therefore benefit from kiosk voting, mobile kiosk 
voting or remote internet voting, but not from email 
voting, which would retain the manual marking of 
the ballot. 
 
3. Those who can vote otherwise only at 
inordinate personal cost - There will be voters who 
could use a voting channel other than the internet to 
cast a personal and secret vote, but only in 
Voters in this category could benefit from email 
voting or remote internet voting. 
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circumstances which would require them to incur 
significantly more than the nominal personal expense 
of voting which is reasonably expected of all voters.  An 
example of a person in this category would be 
someone in a remote part of Australia, or an Australian 
voter living in an overseas country, remote from the 
Australian Embassy (if there is one), and beyond the 
range of the local postal service.  The latter’s only 
option, in the absence of internet voting, would be to 
make a potentially expensive and time consuming trip 
to the capital of the country (or, in the worst case, to 
the nearest neighbouring country with an Australian 
diplomatic mission) to vote in person.  Some “fly in, fly 
out” workers appear also to fall into this category. 
 
4. Those for whom internet voting could 
reduce significant, though not insuperable, 
obstacles to accessing a polling place - This 
category encompasses voters who currently are 
entitled to vote by post, for whom internet voting could 
be a useful substitute, especially where the postal 
service may be problematical.  It will include General 
Postal Voters, and people whose inability to vote at a 
polling place has become apparent only after the cutoff 
(statutory or practical) for the issuing of postal votes. 
 
Kiosk voting would not meet this need. 
5. Those who will benefit specifically from an 
electronic voting interface - This category 
encompasses voters who have special needs which 
could be more effectively met by the flexibility which an 
electronic voting interface can provide.  Examples 
would be voters who have severe mobility issues or 
who are, because of a temporary disability, unable to 
write; voters who would benefit from easy access to 
audio or multi-lingual instructions on how to record the 
vote; voters who use screen readers;  and voters who 
wish to refer to otherwise unavailable how-to-vote 
cards lodged by parties and candidates. 
 
All forms of internet voting other than email voting 
could be potentially beneficial to voters in this 
category, though not necessarily to the same 
extent. 
6. Those who will enjoy enhanced personal 
convenience - There will be people who could, without 
inordinate difficulty, vote using another mechanism, but 
for whom internet voting would still, all things 
considered, be more personally convenient or 
conducive to (though not decisive of) their ability to 
participate.  This category could include electors who 
may currently utilise absent voting; people facing small 
Kiosk voting would not meet this need.  It should be 
noted that “convenience” is a subjective experience 
which will vary from voter to voter.  Some voters 
may see both the ability to vote remotely and the 
ability to vote electronically as convenient.  Others 
may be attracted by the idea of not having to attend 
a polling place, but may find an electronic interface 
less convenient than a paper ballot (especially 
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scale mobility challenges; people suffering from minor 
and unforeseen illnesses on polling day; people who 
find voting away from the political pressures of party 
workers at a polling place more conducive to the 
casting of a considered vote; and voters pressed for 
time to vote who encounter long queues on polling day. 
 
when large ballot papers are involved). 
7. Those who will have an enhanced sense of 
engagement with the election process - There will 
be some voters who will face no real difficulty in voting 
using existing modalities, but who will still feel a 
stronger psychological sense of connection with the 
process if it makes use of the internet, that being a 
medium of communication which to them is more 
familiar than traditional paper-based mechanisms. 
The impact of the various models of internet voting 
from this perspective is likely to vary from voter to 
voter but is likely to be greater for younger voters 
who are more familiar with transacting online. 
The special situation of blind and low vision voters 
6.6 The ability for voters who are blind or have low vision to vote secretly and 
independently has long been a vexed issue.  The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, like 
many other electoral laws in Australia and around the world, makes provision for a voter 
who cannot cast an independent vote to appoint a person or polling official to complete his 
or her ballot paper according to instructions.  Alternative approaches evolved over a 
number of years.   
■ At the 2002 Victorian State election a braille template for ballot papers was trialled.  
By 2006, however, the VEC had abandoned this method in favour of a solution 
based on electronic voting machines (EVMs).  The NSWEC and the Electoral 
Commission of Queensland have both produced braille ballot papers on demand, 
but in a local government election in NSW a braille ballot paper was not provided 
when requested, which led to the successful pursuit of a discrimination case 
against the NSWEC.  This then led to the introduction of iVote.    
■ As early as the 1996 Western Australian election, the introduction of magnifiers 
and closed circuit television magnifiers was greatly welcomed by blindness 
advocacy groups.   This led most EMBs to purchase flat magnifying sheets for on-
demand use in polling places.  
■ When the ACT Electoral Commission introduced EVMs in 2001 they were not 
intended to address the issue of BLV voting, but it was soon realised that with the 
addition of some voice prompts and headphones, the system would greatly assist 
BLV voters in the casting of a secret and independent vote.  
■ By 2006 the VEC, TEC and the ACT all had EVMs, and the AEC followed with its 
electronic voting trial in 2007.  In 2010 the AEC implemented Call Centre voting for 
BLV voters following the discontinuation of the use of EVMs.  The BLV community 
did use this method but in the focus groups that followed a strong view was 
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expressed that this method was neither independent nor private, even though it 
was secret. 
6.7 One of the unspecified benefits of the EVM was the confirmation process.  Even if 
the voter could not use the EVM due to lack of computer ability or some other disability, 
the voter could have someone else complete the onscreen ballot and could then listen to 
the preferences that had been entered for each candidate before confirming and casting 
the ballot.  This was seen as a great step forward from a polling official simply completing 
a paper ballot for the voter on the basis of trust. 
6.8 Within the BLV community views have varied on the importance of an independent 
vote, with some being strongly in favour and others more ambivalent.  In reviewing the 
use of the EVMs in the AEC trial, the majority of voters rated their experience “very good”.  
Many voters were passionate about the freedom and the sense of liberation that using the 
machines gave them.  There were some comments concerning the amount of time it took 
to travel to a site to use the EVM: because members of the blindness community 
generally travel only to familiar sites, travelling to a new site such as a pre-poll voting 
centre which is only established during the election proved challenging, with one voter 
asserting that it took four hours in total to travel and vote.   The blindness support groups 
were very helpful in providing mobility instructions to the pre-poll centres, but it was still 
quite daunting for many. 
6.9 In focus groups conducted with a mix of voters who had and had not used the 
EVMs,  some were still of the view that they were quite happy to go to their local polling 
place and have their spouse/family member complete the ballot paper for them, and saw it 
no differently to someone doing their banking or their tax return.  Others, however, were 
adamant in their support for their newly found independence provided through the use of 
the EVMs. 
6.10 A comment consistently made was that the blindness community would prefer to 
use a method of voting that all voters were using.  They often suggested internet voting, 
arguing that it could be used in the privacy of their own home, in an environment with 
which they were familiar, and with the screen reader or magnification tools that suited their 
particular sight disability.  
Enhancements to the overall electoral process  
Accurate capture of preferences 
6.11 As noted at paragraph 2.10 above, kiosk, mobile and remote internet voting can be 
configured in such a way as to ensure that the voter does not (at least unknowingly) cast 
an informal vote.   In addition, the recording of votes electronically reduces the incidence 
of preferential votes being set aside as “exhausted” during a scrutiny because numbers 
 Page 60    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
written on a ballot paper are unclear or incomplete.  The benefits of this have been well 
demonstrated at ACT elections since 2001.  That having been said, several qualifications 
need to be noted. 
■ Neither of the mechanisms for reducing informality comes into play with email 
voting.  Indeed, a ballot paper scanned at low resolution or photographed in poor 
light conditions and emailed could potentially be more difficult for polling officials to 
interpret than a hardcopy ballot. 
■ The marginal benefits of warning voters about impending informal votes will 
depend on the underlying formality criteria: the more complex the voter’s task, the 
greater could be the potential benefit.  Where informality is already relatively low - 
as at Senate elections, and in jurisdictions which use optional preferential voting - 
less impact would be expected.   
■ The extent of the benefit realised will be significantly influenced by the number of 
people who can utilise internet voting: as that number increases, more votes will 
potentially be saved. 
Faster results 
6.12 Internet voting has the potential in some situations to provide quicker election 
results.  It is, however, important not to overstate the significance of this.  It is most likely 
to be helpful in Tasmania and the ACT, where single transferable vote proportional 
representation is used to elect the governing Chamber.  In those jurisdictions, a capacity 
to capture and apply preference data quickly can make it possible to know significantly 
earlier who is likely to form government.  In the other Australian jurisdictions, the close 
election results typically associated with the single transferable vote are much rarer.  The 
2010 Australian federal election was the first one since the introduction of two-candidate 
preferred vote counts on election night in which the outcome was still uncertain at the end 
of the evening, and of course, even if the result in every seat had been known at the end 
of election night in 2010 with complete certainty, Australians would still not have known 
who was going to be supported by the independents to form a new government.  While 
internet voting might make a difference at the margins in a few seats, there is little scope 
for much improvement in the speed with which overall election results are typically 
delivered, especially when legislation continues to provide for the receipt of postal votes 
after polling day, and to require relatively time-consuming processing of other declaration 
votes.  Here, again, impact will depend on the number of people who use internet voting. 
Turnout 
6.13 Internet voting has the potential to impact on turnout in three different ways.  First, 
it may directly increase the likelihood of voting by persons who basically are engaged with 
the electoral process and wish to vote, but face obstacles or inconvenience in making use 
of traditional polling mechanisms.  The scale of increase in turnout would depend on the 
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particular internet voting modality chosen, and on the traditional facilities currently 
provided.  For example, the potential impact of provision of remote internet voting to 
overseas or interstate voters would be greater for Australian State or Territory elections 
(for which only limited external voting facilities are currently provided) than for federal 
elections (at which voting is already made available Australia-wide, and through the 
extensive network of Australian diplomatic missions).  However, federal elections would 
also benefit. 
6.14 Secondly, it may motivate people who currently are disengaged from the political 
and electoral processes, and who do not turn out to vote, to do so in future.  The likelihood 
that this potential benefit will in fact be realised is much more difficult to assess 
objectively.  On that, several points can be made. 
■ The percentage of enrolled electors who vote at Australian elections has been 
relatively stable over a long period of time, because of compulsory voting and the 
easy access to the many polling places.  One might therefore reasonably doubt 
whether people who are already insufficiently motivated to vote by the prospect of 
a penalty would be substantially more motivated by the availability of internet 
voting. 
■ Detachment from politics is a worldwide trend, driven by a host of different social 
factors, which may or may not be susceptible to technological solutions. 
■ To date, world-wide, internet voting has been implemented on a relatively small 
scale, often targeted at voters with special needs.  There is therefore 
comparatively little reliable evidence available to confirm conjectures about the 
impact of internet voting as a stimulant for turnout.77  
6.15 Thirdly, it might be argued that while the availability of internet voting will not 
necessarily increase turnout, it could prevent a potential disengagement from electoral 
processes postulated to flow from a foreshadowed growing sense among younger voters 
of alienation not from electoral processes per se, but from the use of antiquated voting 
mechanisms.  This is indeed possible, but involves a good deal of speculation about 
future behavioural trends for which there is currently scant available evidence. 
Modernisation 
6.16 Australia’s EMBs are all focussed on modernisation in thought, word or deed.  The 
State and Territory EMBs are currently pursuing a range of technological innovations, 
beyond various electronic voting systems, which encompass a wide range of business 
areas.  These include a variety of schemes to notify registered electors, both within 
                                               
77 On this, Vowles (2012) argues that while “more user-friendly and lower cost means of voting 
such as the internet could be introduced, there is little evidence that the ‘cost’ of voting is 
sufficiently high for such reforms to have a significant impact past an immediate period of novelty 
value”. 
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Australia and overseas via email and SMS, of State and local government elections.  
Another common incorporation of technology is the use of electronic devices for marking-
off voters; scannable cards have also been used in conjunction with these.  Various forms 
like the postal vote application have become available on EMBs’ websites, and there are 
“apps” which can provide the public, candidates and media with extensive information 
about an upcoming election, including progressive results after polling has closed.  Optical 
character recognition software is also used to conduct counts where paper ballots are 
used.  Finally, full automation of ballot paper printing has resulted in savings in the amount 
of paper used. 
6.17 Modernisation is one of the three key themes given special emphasis in the AEC’s 
Strategic Plan 2009-2014.78  Therein, the organisation states an intention to: “review our 
methods for interacting with electors”, aiming to “adopt modern technology to streamline 
processes and increase accessibility”.  The 2010 Statement of Directions which was the 
final output of the AEC’s 2009-10 Business Review also emphasised modernisation, 
flagging as one element of a “future desired state” that “Citizens have electronic means of 
accessing electoral services and are encouraged to use them”.79 
6.18 Modernisation might be seen as an end in itself, to which some use of internet 
voting could contribute.  It can also, however, be pursued as a means to other ends. 
■ Modern processes may ultimately be more likely to generate trust than antiquated 
ones, for the psychological reason that they may with the passage of time be more 
capable of generating a sense of comfortable familiarity. 
■ As time passes it will be harder for EMBs to access and sustain the skills needed 
to manage old-fashioned processes. 
Public demand and expectation 
6.19 Closely linked with the notion that internet voting would represent a form of 
modernisation is the sense that public expectations may make it inevitable that it will 
ultimately be adopted.  This is often inferred from the fact that the public have taken up 
with enthusiasm the opportunity to pursue transactions online which were once performed 
manually.  As noted at paragraphs 3.39 to 3.44 above, however, hard evidence in support 
of this proposition is lacking.  Perhaps because voting at public elections is only an 
occasional activity, pressure for internet voting has predominantly come from groups with 
special needs which only it can meet.   
6.20 One key imponderable is whether the provision of the opportunity to vote on the 
internet to one group within the population would inevitably lead eventually to irresistible 
                                               
78 Australian Electoral Commission (2009b). 
79 Australian Electoral Commission (2010). 
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public pressure for universal internet voting.  Within the time horizon of this paper, such a 
development seems most unlikely.  There are few if any examples in Australia of electoral 
reforms in relation to which public opinion has been the primary driving force, and the 
existence in the past of alternatives to ordinary voting has not led to its being supplanted 
as the primary, “gold standard” voting modality. 
6.21 Other notable categories of voters who might be expected to be broadly in favour 
of internet voting include overseas electors, FIFO workers, and persons living in remote 
communities but with reliable internet connections (such as isolated sheep and cattle 
stations).  The needs or desires of people in such categories are likely to become more 
pressing over time if mail services become less frequent. 
Realisation of efficiencies in the administration of elections 
6.22 Internet voting has the potential (which may or may not be able to be realised in 
practice) to give rise to efficiencies in the administration of elections in a number of 
significant respects. 
Reduction of the logistical burden associated with manual processes 
6.23 Elections are the largest and most complex logistical operations which a country 
undertakes in peacetime, typically engaging the entire adult population in a prescribed 
process implemented under tight time constraints.  For the 2010 Australian federal 
election, over 43 million ballot papers were printed; over 50,000 ballot boxes, over 
150,000 voting screens, and approximately 14,000 recycling bins were produced; and 
approximately 100,000 pencils and 140 kilometres of string were required.  The 
production, distribution and retrieval of these materials is a massive task, with 
environmental as well as cost implications.  In the aftermath of polling day, substantial 
resources also have to be devoted to the receipt, redirection and processing of declaration 
votes. 
6.24 Internet voting has the potential to reduce in the long term, at least to some extent, 
these resource needs and logistical burdens.  The scale of reduction will, however, 
depend very much on the model(s) of internet voting used, and the number of voters for 
whom the facility is provided.   
6.25 One could, as a thought experiment, hypothesize the total replacement of all 
current voting modalities with remote internet voting.  Under such a scenario, all current 
channels of voting would be eliminated, and the logistical and materiel savings would be 
total.  From the point of view of the EMB, the election would simply be managed through a 
massive computer system accessible by voters through a website, and the great bulk of 
the EMB’s efforts would be devoted to managing and maintaining the system and the 
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electoral roll.  Such a scenario is extremely unlikely to be realised in the short to medium 
term. 
6.26 Much more plausibly, internet voting could be offered as an alternative to existing 
mechanisms, and only to a fraction of voters.  Under that scenario, however, logistical 
savings would be much more problematic.  Since the number of voters who might choose 
to vote via the internet would, in the first instance, be difficult to predict, in the short run 
the only realisable savings might be those which could flow from decisions able to be 
made during the election process.  For example, it is likely that the same numbers of 
ballot papers would have to be ordered, printed and distributed as before, but if the 
numbers of postal voters proved to be down because some had voted on the internet, 
savings could be made in casual staff who would otherwise have been employed to 
support the post-polling day processing of postal votes. 
Overseas voting 
6.27 The complexity of managing the process of overseas voting could be significantly 
reduced.  Again, however, the scale of benefit would depend on whether internet voting 
replaced the current model of overseas voting, or supplemented it.  If the latter were the 
case, many of the tasks which currently have to be performed would still be required, with 
the management of the internet voting process constituting an added burden on the EMB. 
Access to required skills 
6.28 As internet use becomes more widespread and large scale operations are 
increasingly computerised, EMBs are likely to encounter greater difficulties in finding 
people with the skills to manage large scale manual operations.  The skills required to 
manage IT-based systems, on the other hand, are likely to become easier to obtain with 
the passage of time (though internet voting is rapidly becoming a specialised area even 
within the discipline of computer science, with which are associated technical skills which 
will likely not come cheaply).  
Cost savings 
6.29 The issue of possible cost savings is discussed at paragraph 7.23 below. 
7. Issues regarding internet voting 
7.1 This Part discusses challenges and concerns which could arise from the use of 
internet voting. 
7.2 As noted at paragraph 1.2 above, internet voting is a controversial topic.  While 
many debates about electoral policy in other areas appear to be motivated by different 
perceptions of partisan interest even where there is agreement at the technical level about 
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what is the best way to proceed, that is not the case in relation to internet voting: the 
disagreements are significantly underpinned by technical concerns. 
7.3 It would be impossible in this paper to do justice to all the points raised in detail in 
what is now a large literature.  This Part therefore seeks to flag matters which are worthy 
of close attention of both the EMBs and political policy makers of Australasian jurisdictions 
contemplating the possible use of internet voting.  It should be emphasised that some of 
the issues discussed below relate to all models of internet voting, while others are only 
significant for particular models.  In addition, issues which would be relevant if internet 
voting were adopted for all voting may have less significance if used for only a limited 
cohort. 
Issues relating to the social context and character of elections 
Voting as a public ritual 
7.4 A fundamental test of the success of an electoral process is whether it is widely 
viewed by society as conferring legitimacy on the legislature or government elected.  That 
may be strongly influenced by the sense of connection, or “ownership”, which the voters 
have for the process.  The value which voters place on electoral processes, and the sense 
of responsibility they feel for ensuring that such processes succeed, is one of the key 
factors that distinguishes established democracies from those still in transition. 
7.5 Some commentators have placed particular importance on the role that the ritual 
of voting at a polling place can play in sustaining people’s sense of shared civic 
engagement, and deplore the notion that it could be replaced by a process which, as they 
see it, downgrades the social significance of the act of voting.  Valelly (1999), focussing 
on remote internet voting, expounds this argument as follows: 
“… Not only will e-voting fail to reverse electoral apathy, it will actually lead us in the wrong 
direction.  Voting is more than the simple act of indicating one’s political preference.  It’s a 




So, if everybody will be able to e-vote, and if e-voting is essentially fraudproof, what could 
be wrong with it?  The problem is that e-voting will transform voting, an inherently public 
activity, into a private one.  Even with the secret ballot, the mechanics of voting are still 
explicitly designed to remind us that, in principle, we are all equal members of a political 
community.  On Election Day, we must leave our homes and offices, travel to a polling 
place, and physically mingle with people who are plainly our equals that day, no matter 
what other differences we have.  Voting, as we currently do it, is a civic ritual, however brief 
it may be. 
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This ritual is valuable not just because it makes us feel good about ourselves.  It also gets 
us to think about public issues differently than we would do otherwise.  While it’s generally 
assumed that people vote on the basis of their pocketbooks, surveys show that most 
people actually focus on things such as the national good, not their narrow self-interests, 
when they vote.  One possible reason for this: when people are obliged to leave their 
homes and enter the public sphere, as they do when the vote, they tend to become more 
public minded. 
E-voting, then, might aptly be called “voting alone”.  If our era is a time of citizen 
disengagement, of staring at screens and passing in and out of our gated communities or 
apartment fortresses as we wave to private security personnel, then e-voting from home is 
all too congruent with the spirit of the age.  Far from enriching democracy, e-voting pushes 
us towards political anomie….”.80   
On that, however, it should be noted that such concerns are primarily relevant to a 
situation in which remote internet voting totally supplants attendance voting, and have less 
force in relation to the use of email voting or remote internet voting by persons who are 
otherwise unlikely to be able to vote, or to vote secretly and personally, at all (unless one 
accepts a “thin edge of the wedge” argument that any use of remote internet vote will 
eventually and inevitably lead to its much more widespread (and perhaps 100%) use by 
voters).  The issue of the role and importance of the ritualistic elements of attendance 
voting is ultimately one which needs to be decided at the societal and political levels, 
rather than by EMBs. 
Maintaining the distinctive character of “serious” voting 
7.6 It was noted at paragraph 4.29 above that as voters become more familiar with 
using the internet, that familiarity, if sensed also in the context of voting, could enhance 
the credibility of the voting process. 
7.7 This issue can, however, be viewed from another perspective.  It is relatively 
common on social media or other websites for people to be invited to “vote” on matters of 
trivia, such as the fate of contestants on reality television shows.  It is at least arguable 
that there could benefits in reinforcing the use of a different channel of voting for public 
elections, if only to reinforce their serious and distinctive character. 
Issues relating to the protection of the integrity of the voting process, 
and trust 
7.8 As noted in Part 1, the extent to which it can be guaranteed that votes cast on the 
internet will not be susceptible to interference of one form or another has been a matter of 
vigorous dispute.  This paper takes no stand on that issue, but flags it as one which any 
EMB or society contemplating the introduction of internet voting will need to address 
                                               
80 This point is also strongly emphasised by Birch (2003). 
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comprehensively at the time: potential users of such a system have a clear right to expect 
that due diligence will be exercised by those who decide on the implementation of internet 
voting.  System integrity needs to be treated as a matter of objective fact, not perception. 
7.9 In considering the risks of internet voting, it is important to bear in mind the 
diversity of possible motives which trouble-makers might have to attack the system.  In 
considering electoral fraud in a broader international context, parties and candidates are 
normally regarded as primary sources of threat, with their motivations being ideological.  
In relation to internet voting, however, threats could conceivably come from: 
■ states or terrorist groups; 
■ persons who wish to manipulate an election result, possibly relating to quite a 
lowly office, in order to pursue financial interests; 
■ persons attracted by the idea of the fame or notoriety which could accrue to 
someone who had successfully attacked a high profile system; or 
■ opponents of internet voting in another country who might seek to use Australia as 
a venue for demonstrating what they saw as inherent weaknesses in the system. 
7.10 Considerable disruption to the voting process could potentially be caused by the 
use of techniques (such as the distribution of emails with links to fake voting websites) 
which did not involve any “hacking” of the official internet voting system per se.  While 
such contingencies might seem unlikely, Canada is currently having to address the 
question of how to deal with a somewhat similar scam perpetrated at the 2011 general 
election, in which robo-calls were used to mislead voters in relation to the casting of their 
votes (Elections Canada (2013)).  In developing schemes for internet voting, there would 
potentially be much to be gained from close consultation with law enforcement authorities 
responsible for issues of data security and cybercrime.  
7.11 One point which might be borne in mind is that the potential impact (and therefore 
perhaps risk) of fraudulent or malicious interference with a voting process is likely to be 
higher where electorates and margins of victory are smaller, and where election victory 
may place the victor in a position to profit personally. 
7.12 Trust, on the other hand, is a matter of perception, and a system which deserves 
to be trusted may not be, while one that doesn’t deserve trust may be.  At paragraph 4.28 
above, some of the diverse sources of trust in electoral systems were identified.  In any 
given situation, there will be some people who will trust a process, some who will not, and 
some who will have no opinion.  Societal trust arises when people in the first group greatly 
outnumber those in the second.  This, however, is one of the reasons why trust tends to 
be built up over a long period of time: it is a process akin to building a coalition in favour of 
a particular scheme.  This largely explains why the literature gives such strong support to 
the use of mechanisms which slowly and carefully consolidate trust over time.  There 
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would be value in further analysis of the sources of trust in electoral processes in 
Australia; and it is worth contemplating how elections might come to be viewed if voters’ 
interactions were, under a universal internet voting model, entirely with websites, rather 
than with polling officials and other citizens. 
Secrecy of the ballot, and voting in a protected environment 
7.13 As noted at paragraphs 5.15 to 5.21 above, the concept of the secret ballot can be 
viewed from two different perspectives: as an individual right, or as a social good.  This 
has implications for whether society might have concerns about the number of people who 
might potentially vote remotely over the internet in an environment in which the actual 
secrecy of their votes, as distinct from their right to a secret vote, is no longer societally 
guaranteed. 
7.14 Such concerns would be of least priority in cases where internet voting was 
targeted at persons who currently cannot vote in any other way, cannot vote secretly and 
personally, or can only vote at inordinate personal expense.  In all of those cases, the 
principle of secret and protected voting can legitimately be weighed against the principle 
of universality, the right of all qualified voters to participate effectively and freely in the 
election process. 
7.15 Greater concerns could be expected in situations where internet voting might lead 
to a larger percentage of persons voting in an unsupervised environment than is currently 
the case.  In that context, it should be noted that where the criteria for voting by post and 
voting pre-poll are similar, the availability of internet voting could conceivably lead to a 
significant shift of voters away from attendance at a pre-poll voting centre towards 
unsupervised internet voting.   Under such a scenario, parties and candidates might well 
be concerned at the loss of the opportunity to provide how-to-vote cards to voters.  
7.16 The possibility of allowing re-voting calls for careful consideration.  Attention needs 
to be paid to the question of whether re-voting limited to repetition of electronic votes, 
rather than re-voting also encompassing the possibility of a final re-vote at a polling place, 
would provide the sorts of protections which are postulated by supporters of re-voting 
processes.  Consideration also needs to be given to the possible implications of allowing 
re-voting in the context of some Australian electoral processes but not all, and to the 
public information challenges which this could pose. 
Transparency 
7.17 The need for new transparency mechanisms to replace those associated with the 
paper ballot remains a matter of fundamental importance, and one which will rise in 
significance in direct proportion to the number of people actually using internet voting.  
Elaboration of such mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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7.18 As noted at paragraph 5.30 above, one point which should be considered by 
EMBs is the nature of their obligations to provide voters with clear advice concerning the 
risks and vulnerabilities of any model of voting, including internet voting.  EMBs might also 
consider the potential legal risks to an election associated with the use of a process which 
might subsequently be proven in court to have had significant vulnerabilities. 
Timing of voting, and the campaign 
7.19   Internet voting can be configured in such a way that a person may vote almost 
immediately after the close of nominations.  If people are able to vote early like that on the 
internet, and significant numbers choose to do so, the traditional sense of the election 
campaign as something which precedes the voters’ choice has the potential to be 
rendered obsolete.  There is a need for societal consideration of how the voting and 
campaign processes should interact, and of the possibility of restricting the period in which 
internet voting might be made available so as to deal with any concerns arising from that 
issue. 
Challenge of ballot structure and devices 
7.20 The challenge of translating the ballot structure of a paper ballot into an 
appropriate electronic interface is likely to be an ongoing one, as the diversity of the 
devices (especially mobile ones) used for internet access increases. 
Registering for internet voting, and voter identification 
7.21 A societal decision will need to be made on what processes of identification might 
reasonably be expected in the case of someone seeking an email or remote internet vote.  
Registration of voters who qualify for an internet vote becomes an exacting process to 
ensure that the EMB is dealing with the voters themselves.   Currently at a polling place a 
person seeking to vote presents in person and, standing before the polling official and 
scrutineers, announces his or her name and address, and claims not to have voted 
already at the election.  When a voter registers for internet voting under current models 
there is limited data by reference to which an EMB can identify the applicant.  Typically, 
the EMB will have details of a voter’s full name, enrolled address and date of birth.  Voters 
do not have an “account number”, nor will they have they lodged a password with the 
EMB to transact online.  While EMBs are beginning to collect email addresses and mobile 
phone numbers, that is not being done with the view to enabling the voter to undertake 
secure transactions with the EMB.  Rather, the EMB is collecting that information to be 
able to contact or inform the voter.  However, there is currently a “whole of government” 
approach to e-government for the Australian public.  A person who is transacting with 
Centrelink, Medicare, Child Support, Veterans’ Affairs or the National eHealth Record 
System can open an account at www.aus.gov.au, where the applicant is required to prove 
identity.   
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Witnessing 
7.22 In a number of Australian jurisdictions, there continues to be a requirement for an 
authorised witness to be present when a person records a postal vote.  Where a postal 
voter at a federal election is outside Australia and cannot find another person qualified to 
perform the witnessing function, the voter’s passport details have to be supplied.  By 
analogy with postal voting, consideration might be given to whether there might be an 
appropriate role for a witnessing mechanism in the context of email voting or remote 
internet voting.  
Cost issues 
7.23 A number of issues need to be taken into account when considering the potential 
cost of providing internet voting. 
■ Already, Australia has seen one case - the AEC ADF trials of 2007 - in which the 
relatively high per voter cost of an internet voting model was a key factor which led 
to its abandonment. 
■ Costs - both upfront and ongoing - are likely to be diverse and substantial, if only 
because the political sensitivity of any new voting modality dictates a need for 
EMBs to take all possible steps to minimise risk.   
■ The fixed development costs of implementing a high-integrity system of internet 
voting are likely to be largely independent of the ultimate number of users, and an 
EMB that chooses that path will need to be prepared to bear the cost of running its 
internet voting system in parallel with existing manual systems. 
■ A perceived need to ensure that systems reflect the latest expectations of internet 
users may well mean that redevelopment will be a permanent task, with 
associated ongoing system recertification costs.  (For example, a model based on 
voting remotely on laptop or netbook computers would by now have been 
rendered dated by the increasing use of smartphones to access the internet.)    
■ The estimation of potential cost savings is a matter of considerable complexity, 
and a detailed analysis of the issue falls well beyond the scope of this paper.81  
Opportunities to offset costs with savings may be limited in the short term, not 
least because if internet voting is but one of several voting modalities provided as 
options, it may not be clear in advance how many voters will actually use it.  (In 
that context, it might be noted that the increase in early voting at federal elections 
in recent years does not appear to have yet produced a proportional decrease in 
resources needed on election day.) 
■ The technical skills required for the development of internet voting systems in-
house, especially in specialised fields such as cryptography, are likely to have to 
                                               
81 For more detailed discussions of the cost of internet voting, see International IDEA (2011), 
Goldsmith (2011, pp. 37-41),  
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be purchased.  If, however, EMBs opt to purchase a system “off the shelf”, they 
will still have to acquire new skill sets to enable them to choose an appropriate 
system, and to manage contracts. 
7.24 Aside from these issues, careful consideration needs to be given to opportunity 
costs.  In considering a major change such as the introduction of internet voting, it might 
well be thought justifiable to undertake net additional expenditure to ensure that it 
proceeds; but it is appropriate then to ask, and indeed to assess critically, where internet 
voting sits in the EMB’s and the nation’s electoral reform priorities.  Experience in other 
countries where major projects have been undertaken to implement new technology 
highlights the risk that such an exercise may demand so many resources, and so much 
management attention, as to create serious obstacles to any other reform initiatives.  The 
risk of disruption to an EMB’s activities will be particularly great if attempts to implement 
internet voting do not enjoy bipartisan support.   
8. Concluding observations 
8.1 This Part sets out a number of observations relating to the possible place of 
internet voting in Australasia’s electoral systems.  These are not intended as prescriptive 
recommendations, but as pointers to issues which jurisdictions contemplating the use of 
internet voting might wish to consider in more detail. 
1. In Australia and around the world, internet voting has only been taken up on a 
comparatively limited scale for public elections.  This stands in stark contrast to the 
way in which internet-based activities have come to dominate many other fields of 
endeavour, and highlights the extent to which internet voting remains a matter of 
dispute. 
2. There is no emerging crisis in Australasian voting practice, such as massive failure 
of paper supplies, to which the only possible response is the introduction of 
internet voting.  That having been said, it would seem inevitable that paper 
balloting will, sooner or later, have to be replaced by some form of electronic 
voting, which may or may not involve the internet.  Whether or not that 
development will constitute a crisis in itself will very much depend on how diligently 
EMBs have prepared for that contingency.  For that reason, prudence clearly 
dictates that Australian EMBs should be starting now to increase, or to continue to 
increase, their focus on the challenges and prospects of electronic and internet 
voting; to enhance their in-house expertise in the area; to further explore 
opportunities for cooperation in system research and development, and to 
undertake appropriate pilot projects where the opportunities to do so arise. 
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3. A shift to universal internet voting would be a revolutionary development in the 
Australian context, producing what might be seen as a fundamental change in the 
character of electoral processes.  Such a change is not being advocated by any 
Australasian EMB, nor does it appear to be being pushed at the political level. 
4. Whether the use of internet voting on a smaller scale to meet the needs of 
particular groups of voters would inevitably lead to its use on a larger scale is a 
matter worth considering. 
5. Any decision-making on whether, and if so how, to use internet voting in an 
acceptably secure way will need to be based on a robust risk assessment and 
management process which takes into account: 
 the nature of vulnerabilities;  
 the probability that they will be exploited;  
 the impacts which any such exploitation could have;  
 strategies which could be put in place to mitigate any such impacts;  
 the willingness of relevant stakeholders (e.g. governments, political parties, 
parliamentary representatives, EMBs and members of the voting public) to 
live with a particular identified level of residual risk; and 
 comparative risks associated with other voting modalities, including those 
currently used. 
6. A number of the issues raised in this paper relate to the place of elections in 
Australia’s system of democratic government, or to their fundamental character.  
While EMBs may have views on them, and be in a position to provide useful 
commentary or advice, they are properly matters for consideration at the societal 
or parliamentary level. 
7. Assessments of the viability of internet voting need to be approached holistically, 
taking into account not just implications for polling and counting but also for 
campaigning.  The legitimate expectations that stakeholders such as candidates, 
parties and scrutineers have regarding the way in which they will be able to 
perform their functions also need to be given full weight. 
8. Any process for the implementation of internet voting needs to be supported by a 
strong and informed public and political consensus in favour of such a move.  The 
development of such a consensus is likely to be an objective realisable only in the 
long term, but an incremental approach, starting with pilot or small scale 
implementations, and proceeding at a rate with which key stakeholders are 
comfortable, would seem likely to provide a reasonable way forward. 
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9. Societies and EMBs need to assess critically and realistically the cost and 
resourcing implications, including opportunity costs, of the introduction of internet 
voting. 
10. From the perspective of voter enfranchisement, the most compelling case for the 
use of internet voting in the short term (assuming that technical concerns about the 
process can be adequately addressed) would appear to arise in relation to voters 
for whom it would be a “game changer”: those who cannot otherwise vote at all, or 
cannot otherwise vote secretly and personally.  An initial focus on such voters 
would be less problematical in terms of issues of vote secrecy and the voting 
environment than a more widespread use, and would be readily justifiable on the 
basis of the important principle of universality of access, especially for people with 
disabilities. 
11. An initial focus on a relatively small cohort of voters could also serve as a useful 
risk mitigation strategy, in the sense that if problems arise, the smaller the number 
of voters affected, the lesser will be the probability that the result of an election will 
have been influenced. 
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Appendix A - Consideration of electronic or internet voting by 
federal parliamentary committees  
The 1998 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of 
the 1998 Federal Election and matters related thereto - JSCEM - June 
2000 
A1. The Committee received public submissions that a computerised voting system 
would reduce costs and that the AEC should make use of the TAB electronic betting grid.  
The Committee dismissed these suggestions, saying that such a system would not be an 
effective measure against security, fraud and efficiency concerns at the time.82 
The 2001 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the conduct of 
the 2001 Federal Election, and matters related thereto - JSCEM - June 
2003 
A2. Electronic voting was considered under a proposed change to the electoral 
system.  The Committee identified advantages - secrecy for assisted voters, convenience 
and counting - and disadvantages - security, logistics and cost.83  The AEC provided a 
report on an internet voting system trialled in the USA for the Democratic Primaries in 
Arizona and found that:  
“widespread internet voting assumes a secure infrastructure of voter terminals that simply 
does not exist.  The average computer user is relatively untrained in defence procedures 
regarding viruses.”.84 
A3. Emphasis was also placed on the considerable transparency that paper based 
voting provides.85  The New Zealand service of downloading a ballot paper and 
declaration certificate from a secure internet site was also noted.86  The Committee 
commented that it did not support the AEC’s recommendation to proceed with unspecified 
pilot trials of electronic voting.87 
                                               
82 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2000, paras. 4.83-4). 
83 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2003, paras. 7.54-5). 
84 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2003, para. 7.60). 
85 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2003, para. 7.61). 
86 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2003, para. 7.63). 
87 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2003, para. 7.67). 
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The 2004 Federal Election - Report of the Inquiry into the Conduct of 
the 2004 Federal Election and Matters Related Thereto - JSCEM - 
September 2005 
A4. The Committee considered the concept of remote electronic voting in a general 
sense, including methods which would come under the definition of internet voting in this 
paper and other systems.  Some of the advantages of remote electronic voting were that 
defence force personnel serving overseas and Antarctic electors could use the system, 
allowing a secret vote to the latter; with further beneficiaries considered being overseas, 
remote and disabled voters.88  Disadvantages included security concerns, lack of 
transparency, increase in potential for coercion and intimidation, insufficient campaign 
time and the violation of the secret vote.89 
A5.  It was recommended that the AEC trial remote electronic voting for overseas 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian Federal Police personnel and for 
Australians living in the Antarctic.90  It also stressed that these trials were not to be seen 
as a precursor to wider implementation.91 
Report on the 2007 federal election electronic voting trials - Interim 
report of the inquiry into the conduct of the 2007 election and matters 
related thereto - JSCEM - March 2009 
A6. In this report, the Committee examined both the remote electronic voting trials for 
the ADF personnel serving overseas and the trial of electronically assisted voting for blind 
and low vision electors.  Neither system technically used the internet.  The former used 
the more secure DRN.  The latter used computers connected to a secure local area 
network. 
A7. The Committee recommended that due to high costs, and additional burdens 
placed on defence force personnel in operational areas, electronic voting should not be 
continued. 
Report on the conduct of the 2007 federal election and matters related 
thereto - JSCEM - June 2009 
A8. The Committee referred to a supplementary submission from the AEC, which 
suggested that due to the high cost of providing electronic voting machines at static 
polling places for blind and low vision electors, perhaps the “voting software that 
underpinned the electronic voting trials is deployed over the internet rather than on 
                                               
88 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2005, paras. 11.120-126). 
89 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2005, paras. 11.127-130). 
90 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2005, rec. 43). 
91 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2005, para. 11.136). 
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hardware in a polling place”.92  The recommendation from the Committee was that the 
AEC continue to work with the appropriate organisations to develop alternative 
arrangements which provide viable, secret and independent voting.93 
Australia’s Overseas Representation - Punching below our weight -
Inquiry of the Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee - Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - October 2012 
A9. The Committee noted that the AEC commented that there was an increasing 
expectation by Australian electors travelling or residing overseas to be able to interact with 
the Australian Government through electronic means.94  There were several methods 
nominated for overseas voting, one of which was voting over the internet.95  The AEC 
noted that while online voting is an attractive proposition at a superficial level, there were 
questions about its reliability.96 
Cancer of the bush or salvation for our cities? Fly-in, fly-out and drive-
in, drive-out workforce practices in Regional Australia - Inquiry into the 
use of ‘fly-in, fly-out’ (FIFO) workforce practices in regional Australia - 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia -
February 2013 
A10. The Committee recommended that: 
“… the Commonwealth Government charge the Australian Electoral Commission to 
develop an electronic voting system for voters living or working in remote areas to facilitate 
easier access and ensure more accurate population figures are recorded.”.97 
A11. The Committee considered that although initial costs may be high, “it is essential 
to preserve and support ease of access to voting for dispersed populations”.98    
                                               
92 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2009b, para. 11.42). 
93 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (2009b, rec. 49). 
94 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2012, para. 4.117). 
95 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2012, para. 4.118). 
96 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (2012, para. 4.121). 
97 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia (2013, rec. 16). 
98 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Regional Australia (2013, para. 5.79). 
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Appendix B - State and Territory Legislation 
General 
B1. In no State is it difficult to obtain a postal vote.  All jurisdictions specify broad 
categories of who may so vote, and although there may be penalty provisions applicable 
to people who apply for a postal vote when not entitled to one, their enforcement would be 
a very costly and near impossible exercise. 
New South Wales 
B2. The Electoral Commissioner is given power to approve procedures for technology 
assisted voting but any procedure must provide for: the pre-registration of eligible electors, 
the making of records of those who vote; the authentication of the vote; the maintenance 
of the secrecy of the vote; the secure transmission of the vote, and the physical 
production of the completed ballot paper for bundling.99  Penalty provisions relating to 
maintaining secrecy for technology assisted voted are also provided,100 as is a penalty 
provision to protect computer hardware and software from interference.101 
Victoria 
B3. The Electoral Act 2002 (VIC) provides for electronic voting at an electronic voting 
centre for specified electors.102  The Act requires the Commission to ensure that any 
electronic voting systems are secure from interference and that the integrity of voting is 
maintained.103  A witness is required for postal voting.104 
Queensland 
B4. The Electoral Act 1992 (QLD) requires that an elector request a ballot paper from 
an issuing officer.105  For posted declaration votes, which can be cast by an ordinary 
postal voter, a witness is required.106  
Western Australia 
B5. The Electoral Act 1907 (WA) prescribes specific ballot paper requirements.107  
Polling places must have separate compartments which are to be furnished with a 
                                               
99 Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 (NSW) s. 120AC. 
100 Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 (NSW) s. 120AG. 
101 Parliamentary Electorates and Elections Act 1912 (NSW) s. 120AI. 
102 Electoral Act 2002 (VIC) s. 110D. 
103 Electoral Act 2002 (VIC) s. 110F 
104 Electoral Act 2002 (VIC) s. 106. 
105 Electoral Act 1992 (QLD) s. 107(3). 
106 Electoral Act 1992 (QLD) s. 119. 
107 Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s. 113. 
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pencil.108  An elector casting an early vote must have a witness, and vote so that the 
witness does not see the vote.109 
South Australia 
B6. The Electoral Act 1985 (SA) explicitly outlines the marking of the ballot paper by a 
voter and specifies that this must be done in private.110  If a declaration vote is cast away 
from a polling place then a witness is required.111  If two or more declaration ballots 
papers from a single elector are received then the first is accepted and the remainder 
rejected.112 
Tasmania 
B7. The Electoral Act 2004 (TAS) permits the Commission to approve any procedures 
that are reasonable and appropriate to assist an elector who is otherwise unable to 
vote.113  Additionally, the Commission may approve procedures to enable an elector, 
external to Tasmania, to vote at an election.114 
Australian Capital Territory 
B8. The Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) provides that the ballot papers may be in electronic 
form and that the Commissioner can approve a computer program to be used for 
electronic voting.115  The subsequent section requires that those devices and programs to 
be used for electronic voting must be kept secure from interference at all times.116  
Additionally the Act provides that paper ballots must made be available at a polling 
place.117  In order to maintain secrecy of the vote, a provision explicitly prohibits any 
photographing of a completed ballot.118  There is no requirement for a witness in order to 
cast a postal vote.  The Act requires that attendance voting must be done in private.119 
Northern Territory 
B9. The Electoral Commissioner has the power under the Electoral Act (NT) to 
approve electronic or other automated systems for targeted groups of voters which 
include disabled voters.120  The ballot paper requirements are prescribed by the 
                                               
108 Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s. 110. 
109 Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s. 92(2)(c). 
110 Electoral Act 1985 (SA) ss. 76 & 79. 
111 Electoral Act 1985 (SA) s. 82(1)(c). 
112 Electoral Act 1985 (SA) s. 91(2). 
113 Electoral Act 2004 (TAS) s. 113(1). 
114 Electoral Act 2004 (TAS) s. 132. 
115 Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) ss. 114 & 118A. 
116 Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) ss. 118B. 
117 Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) s. 131. 
118 Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) s. 315A. 
119 Electoral Act 1992 (ACT) s. 134. 
120 Electoral Act (NT) s. 85A. 
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Regulations.121  A witness must be present for postal voting.122  The Act requires that 
attendance voting be carried out in private.123 
New Zealand 
B10. There is no legislative requirement for identification to be shown at a polling 
place.124  Once a voter has received a ballot paper he or she must retire to a compartment 
to vote alone and secretly;125 however, a voter may elect to receive assistance in certain 
circumstances.126  A category of special voters exists, and different methods of voting can 
be prescribed for different classes of special voters.127  Those who qualify as special 
voters include those not on the printed roll, absent from their district on polling day, 
overseas, ill, or pregnant; and those covered by grounds of religious objection.  The form 
of ballot papers which can be used by special voters is prescribed by the Electoral 
Regulations 1996 (NZ).  To apply for a special vote, a declaration must be witnessed.128  
A specific category of special voter is the overseas special voter, who can be 
electronically issued a ballot paper.129  
  
                                               
121 Electoral Act (NT) s. 40. 
122 Electoral Act (NT) s. 67. 
123 Electoral Act (NT) s. 53. 
124 The Electoral Act 1993 (NZ), s. 166 provides for certain questions to be put to voters where a 
person is suspected of dual voting.  There is no general provision for a person to be questioned as 
to their identity when they vote in NZ. 
125 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s. 168(1). 
126 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s. 170. 
127 Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) ss. 172(1) & (2). 
128 Electoral Regulations 1996 (NZ) s. 20.  Technically all advance votes are special votes under s. 
61(3) of the Electoral Act 1993.  However, since 2011 the requirement to complete a declaration 
has been done away with for voters who vote in advance in a voting place where their name can be 
marked off the roll. 
129 Electoral Regulations 1996 (NZ) s. 45A. 
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Appendix C - Current positions of ECANZ members in relation 
to internet voting 
Commonwealth 
C1. At present, the legal framework for federal elections does not provide for internet 
voting.  It would be possible, under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 as it currently 
stands to make regulations permitting kiosk voting for BLV electors, but not mobile 
internet voting, email voting, or remote internet voting. 
New South Wales 
C2. New South Wales currently has legislation in place providing for internet voting 
and telephone voting.  NSW intends to expand the use of this facility: details of its plans 
are set out in New South Wales Electoral Commission (2013b).  Resources are 
purchased for each election.  The software is acquired through an RFT, however NSW 
retains control of the election processes and database. 
Victoria 
C3. There is currently no legislation in place to support remote electronic voting: 
coverage is only for electronic voting in polling places.  These kiosks have internet 
connectivity, but the vote is cast in the polling place.  The Victorian Parliament’s Electoral 
Matters Committee is currently investigating the benefits of all models of electronic voting.  
Details of the VEC’s plans are set out in Victorian Electoral Commission (2013). 
Queensland 
C4. There is a degree of interest at the political level in the use of internet voting for 
BLV voters, and for electors in remote areas.  Because State and local government 
elections are held in close proximity, any such system would probably have to be 
introduced concurrently for both levels of government.  Queensland would be unlikely to 
be in a position to develop a system on its own.  Legislative change would be required, 
specifically to the procedures for voting currently prescribed. 
Western Australia 
C5. Internet voting would have potential for certain classes of voters, similar to the 
cohorts covered in New South Wales.  There is a potential to use electronic voting in 
smaller commercial elections.  Current legislation makes no provision for internet voting. 
South Australia 
C6. There are no plans to implement electronic voting, nor is there any substantial 
discussion of such an option at the political level (though at one point interest was being 
shown in the possibility of providing such a facility to BLV voters).  At election time, 
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relatively few votes are cast outside South Australia.  The Electoral Commission of South 
Australia is not funded to undertake research and development in the area of internet 
voting. 
Tasmania 
C7. Currently there are no plans for internet voting beyond the Express Voting facility 
and the BLV kiosks being used at parliamentary elections.  A recent proposal for the use 
of internet voting at local government elections was considered by a parliamentary 
committee, but not adopted.130  
C8. In theory, current legal provisions could allow particular cohorts of electors to vote 
via any means deemed reasonable and appropriate by the Commission.  At present, 
however, the cost to the TEC of developing a system of internet voting on its own would 
be prohibitive.  
Australian Capital Territory 
C9. There are no plans for remote internet voting due to the compact nature of the 
Territory.  Pressure may come eventually from voters who are beyond the reach of the 
postal system.  The ACT Electoral Commission has implemented a system of internet 
voting for Yes/No commercial ballots, but lacks funding and resources to pursue the 
implementation of internet voting further.  While some current legal provisions might 
theoretically provide a basis for the introduction of some forms of internet voting for some 
groups, the better view is that a further mandate would need to be sought from the 
Legislative Assembly, given doubts as to whether such an interpretation was intended. 
Northern Territory 
C10. There are neither plans to implement, nor political pressure for implementing, 
electronic voting.  Internet voting would be challenging in the territory due to its 
demographic makeup and difficult geography, which leads to limited connectivity.  Faxes 
are still used extensively. 
New Zealand 
C.11 The Electoral Amendment Regulations 2013, due to come into force on 1 February 
2014, will enable overseas voters  to upload completed ballots and their declaration to a 
secure portal on the Commission’s website at the 2014 general election.  The right to a 
secret ballot is waived when completing the declaration.  NZ is implementing an e-
government project where citizens can opt in and be issued with a unique electronic 
identity credential.  This may be considered should any internet voting be suggested in the 
future.    
                                               
130 Parliament of Tasmania (2012, pp. 29-34).  
 Page 82    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
Appendix D - Instruments and documents elaborating 
principles relevant to internet voting 
D1. Various international instruments and other analytical documents seek to: 
■ declare human rights or political rights; and/or  
■ identify criteria for, or principles relevant to the conduct of, free and fair elections; 
and/or 
■ commit countries to a recognition of such rights, and to the conduct of such 
elections. 
In the extracts from some of these documents set out below, provisions and requirements 
relevant to internet voting are italicised thus. 
D2. A major effort has been made in the last 20 years to define global, regional or 
national standards for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections.  The texts set out in 
this Appendix are by no means exhaustive, and represent only the most important 
sources of guidance with direct relevance to Australia.  Additional analyses, and 
references to further relevant documents, can be found in Goodwin-Gill (2006), Elklit and 
Svensson (1997) and Elklit (2000). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
D3. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly on 10 December 1948, states that: 
“Article 2 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status... 
Article 21 
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives... 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
D4. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is non-binding, its provisions 
have been further elaborated upon in binding international agreements including the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  The ICCPR, to which 
Australia is a party, provides that: 
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“Article 2 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant...  
Article 25  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;  
To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors... 
Article 26 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law.  In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to 
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.”. 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair 
Elections 
D5. International standards relating to electoral democracy are now embodied in a 
wide range of documents.  One useful source of these standards is the Declaration on 
Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (the IPU Declaration), which was adopted by the Inter-
Parliamentary Council of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on 26 March 1994 with the 
unanimous support of the delegations present, including Australia.  Whilst the IPU 
Declaration is not legally binding on members of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, including 
Australia, it has been argued to have significant authority and moral persuasiveness as it 
is founded in principles of ‘international law and in the practices of states and international 
organizations’.  
D6. The IPU Declaration recommends principles and standards including that: 
 no eligible citizen shall be denied the right to vote or disqualified from registration 
as a voter, otherwise than accordance with objectively verifiable criteria prescribed 
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by law, and provided that such measures are consistent with the State’s obligations 
under international law; 
 every voter has the right to equal and effective access to a polling station in order 
to exercise his or her right to vote; 
 the right to vote in secret is absolute and shall not be restricted in any way 
whatsoever; 
 everyone has the right to join a political party or organisation for the purposes of 
competing in an election; 
 everyone individually and together has the right to express political opinions 
without interference; and 
 states should take the necessary legislative steps and other measures, in 
accordance with their constitutional processes, to guarantee the rights and 
institutional framework for periodic and genuine, free and fair elections, in 
accordance with their obligations under international law.” 
Instruments elaborating the rights of specific groups 
D7. An instrument of particular significance is the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, of which article 29 (“Participation in political and public life”) provides, 
among other things, that: 
“States Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and the 
opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others, and shall undertake: 
a) To ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in 
political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons with 
disabilities to vote and be elected, inter alia, by: 
i. Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, 
accessible and easy to understand and use; 
ii. Protecting the right of persons with disabilities to vote by secret ballot in 
elections and public referendums without intimidation, and to stand for 
elections, to effectively hold office and perform all public functions at all 
levels of government, facilitating the use of assistive and new technologies 
where appropriate; 
iii. Guaranteeing the free expression of the will of persons with disabilities as 
electors and to this end, where necessary, at their request, allowing 
assistance in voting by a person of their own choice; 
…”. 
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Principles identified in the 2009 Electoral Reform Green Paper 
D8. Paragraph 2.10 of the Australian Government’s 2009 Electoral Reform Green 
Paper - Strengthening Australia’s Democracy (Australian Government (2009)) sets out a 
series of principles which, it argues, “might be regarded as the basic principles of an 
electoral system for Australia”.  They include the following: 
 Representation: Elected legislative bodies should reasonably reflect the voting 
preferences of the Australian electorate.  Representatives from the diversity of the 
Australian community should be able to stand for election to legislative bodies.  
Balloting processes should enable voters to truthfully express their choices 
between candidates or parties. …  
 Universality: Qualifications for voting should be universal and non-discriminatory, 
and all persons qualified to vote should have equitable access to enrolment and to 
voting, without undue difficulty or inconvenience.  Appropriate processes and 
facilities should be devised to cater for electors whose specific needs would make 
ordinary voting unduly burdensome. 
 Neutrality: Elections should be administered impartially, by politically neutral and 
independent bodies.  Election management bodies should perform their functions 
in a way which promotes public trust in them, and in the election process.  Voters 
should be able to vote in politically neutral venues.  There should be protections 
against the inappropriate use of the resources of the state for political benefit.  
 Transparency in electoral administration: Participants in electoral processes should 
have access to adequate information about the basis for decisions on the operation 
of the electoral machinery. 
 Integrity: Appropriate mechanisms should be put in place to: 
– guarantee a secret ballot; 
– ensure that campaigning and voting is free of any fear or intimidation; 
– preclude voting by persons not qualified to do so; 
– preclude anyone from voting more than once; 
– provide for external scrutiny of electoral processes; 
– ensure that votes are not bought or sold; and 
– enable votes to be counted and tabulated quickly and accurately, without any 
fraudulent interference. 
 Rule of law: Electoral processes should be governed by clear and unambiguous 
laws and procedures, providing genuine opportunities for complaints about the 
process to be lodged and dealt with in an even-handed and transparent way.  
Electoral processes should be appropriately open to scrutiny and challenge by 
parties, candidates and voters. …  
 Flexibility: Within appropriate boundaries, there should be mechanisms in place to 
enable prompt adjustments to be made to processes and procedures to reflect 
changes in societal expectations, and to take advantages of opportunities arising 
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from technological change.  This should be balanced against the need to ensure 
sufficient stability to maintain public trust and confidence in electoral systems.  
Ethical obligations on election administrators 
D9. The Code of Conduct for the Ethical and Professional Administration of Elections 
published in 1998 by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(International IDEA) flags the importance of transparency, accuracy, and provision of 
service to voters, as follows. 
“ETHICAL PRINCIPLE 3  
Election administration must be transparent 
15. For an election to be successful, participants in the process have to feel able to 
accept the decisions of the election administration.  Those participants will most likely feel 
able to accept those decisions if they can easily satisfy themselves that the decisions were 
made appropriately.  To do that, they must have access to the information on which 
decisions are based. 
16. Of course, each election will generate a large amount of data, extensive 
databases, and many documents.  Generally, it is not practical to provide access to, or 
copies of, all the data or every one of those documents to every person who may want 
access or copies. 
However, election administrators should be prepared: 
(i) To justify their decisions. 
(ii) To make freely available the information on which each decision was based. 
(iii) To arrange effective and reasonable access to relevant documents and 
information, within the framework of the country’s electoral and freedom of 
information laws. 
17. In addition, election administrators and administrations should: 
(i) Ensure that the agents of each political party or candidate can fully and effectively 
exercise their legal rights. 
(ii) Consult with participants in the electoral process on a regular basis, and in relation 
to specific decisions, if it is appropriate to do so in the circumstances. 
(iii) Provide an explanation, in response to reasonable requests, for a decision they 
have made as part of the electoral process, or a decision made as part of the 
general operation of the election administration. 
 Page 87    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
(iv) Establish a system that allows interested parties to access, in a timely manner, all 
critical information, documents and databases used in an election process, or used 
in the normal operation of the election administration. 
(v) Disclose any deficiency in the administration of an election if it comes to their 
attention. 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLE 4 
Election administration must be accurate 
18. It follows from the discussion of Ethical Principle 3 that, for decisions of election 
administrators to be satisfactory to the participants, the information on which the decision is 
based must be accurate as well as accessible.  Inaccurate or unreliable information can 
undermine confidence in both the administration’s decisions and its general competence. 
19. Election administrators and administrations must perform every task on the basis 
of the highest standards of accuracy of information and objectivity of analysis.  In 
particular, they should: 
(i) Ensure that information is collected, compiled, and published in a way that is 
systematic, clear, and unambiguous. 
(ii) Do anything necessary, within the country’s legal framework, to ensure that all the 
information they compile, use or publish has sound factual basis. 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLE 5 
Election administration must be designed to serve the voters 
20. Election administrators and administrations should work to provide to every voter 
the highest quality service required to enable voters to exercise their rights with the least 
possible inconvenience, given the circumstances and the country’s legal framework.  In 
particular, they should: 
(i) Make it as convenient as possible for voters to participate in the election process. 
(ii) Ensure that voters adequately understand the election process. 
(iii) Do everything possible to provide a way to vote for people with special needs, 
such as blind, physically handicapped, or illiterate voters, or voters living in remote 
areas.”. 
The concept of the secret ballot in Australian law 
D10. In Australia, the concept of the secret ballot  has been subjected to judicial 
interpretation, most notably in the leading case of Re William Joseph Yarran v Michael 
 Page 88    Internet voting in Australian election systems  
Blurton and others [1992] FCA 199,131 which turned on the requirement in the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 that voting at ATSIC Regional Council 
elections be by secret ballot.  Delivering the Court’s judgement, Justice French (now Chief 
Justice French of the High Court of Australia) made the following observations in the 
course of a detailed analysis: 
“41. The history of legislative and judicial approaches to the requirement for secrecy in 
voting demonstrates variations in understanding of the necessary elements of a secret 
ballot.  The different approaches to very similar voting arrangements adopted by Gray J. in 
Pullen's case and Olney J. in Brahim suggest that contemporary views of what is 
necessary may differ according to the circumstances of the case.  Accepting that there is a 
range of possible voting systems which would answer the description "secret ballot", the 
question is what are the minimum necessary conditions to be met before a voting system 
can be so characterised.  It must be answered by reference to the purpose of the secret 
ballot.  In relation to parliamentary, local government and union elections, that purpose is 
to encourage voters to exercise a choice for their preferred candidate free from the 
possibility that any social, economic, physical or other sanctions may be applied to them 
for voting or not voting in a particular way.  Where the vote cast cannot be known, 
promises to vote in a specific way cannot be verified.  In the absence of information about 
the vote cast, threats and inducements have little or diminished force. 
42. Having regard to the purpose of the secret ballot, the mechanism adopted must 
enable the elector to cast a vote in private, that is to say without disclosing it to any other 
person, and must enable the anonymity of that vote to be protected.  This may be achieved 
by methods which would be described as physical or mechanical.  They may be supported 
by the imposition upon electoral officials of appropriate statutory duties of non-disclosure.  
The question whether a given mix of techniques constitutes a secret ballot involves an 
assessment of the extent to which it achieves the objectives of a private vote and 
protection of anonymity.  What is clear, in my opinion, is that despite the use in Victoria in 
1856 of a system under which the voter's electoral number appeared on the ballot paper, 
that would not be accepted as a secret ballot today.  Physical isolation of the voter and a 
system for separating or keeping separate the voter's identity and the record of the vote 
cast are essential elements of the modern understanding of the secret ballot.  The 
provisions under which blind, illiterate or incapacitated electors cast their votes with the 
assistance of an electoral official is a compromise adapted to the particular class of case.  
It would not be understood as a secret ballot if applied to the wider population of electors.”. 
  
                                               
131 Federal Court of Australia (1992).  
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